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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme 
Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Cheryl, Inc. 's 
Motion for Revision of the Decision Denying Summary Judgment. The standard of review 
on summary judgment issues is de novo. See Innerlight v. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31, 
H 8, 214 P.3d 854. In the alternative, appellant Cheryl, Inc. submits that the district court 
entered judgment based on an inconsistent verdict. Therefore, the Court should order a new 
trial. See Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Appellant Cheryl, Inc. believes that interpretation of the following may be 
determinative of portions of this appeal. 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
• Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury case wherein plaintiff/appellee Teresa Guss was injured after 
receiving cosmetic services from defendant/appellant Cheryl, Inc. ("Cheryl"). After Ms. 
Guss had finished her treatment with Cheryl, Inc., defendant Derek Edvalson ("Derek"), the 
adult son of Cheryl Edvalson (the owner of Cheryl, Inc.), assisted Ms. Guss to her vehicle. 
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Ms. Edvalson did not assist Ms. Guss into her vehicle, nor did any employee assist Ms. Guss. 
As Derek assisted Ms. Guss into her vehicle, Ms. Guss sustained injuries. Thereafter Ms. 
Guss sued Cheryl, Inc. and Derek for negligence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cheryl Edvalson is the owner of defendant Cheryl, which is a twenty-one-year-old 
skin care business that provides facials and waxing treatments. (Trial Transcript ("TT") 
138:2-11; 169:9-15; 172:11-13). Cheryl ran the business out of her home (TT 382:5-8), 
which is located at 5276 Morning Sky Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. (TT 145:17-21). During 
March 2004, Ms. Edvalson, on behalf of Cheryl, employed three individuals - Julie 
Henrickson, Jill Fuller-Neiber, and Natalie Fuller - on a part-time basis. (TT 138:7-11). 
Derek Edvalson is the son of Ms. Edvalson and, during March 2004, he was 21 years 
old and living at home. (TT 378:25-379:15). At that time, he attended school at Salt Lake 
Community College. (TT 168:19-22; 381:11-14). Occasionally, his mother would ask him 
to bring in a heavy box, mow the lawn, shovel the driveway, or something of that nature. 
(TT 177:20-25). At no time, however, was Derek employed by Cheryl. (TT 177:8-15; 
383:3-5). 
Ms. Edvalson became acquainted with Ms. Guss when Ms. Guss began receiving 
facial treatments in 2001. (TT 176:7-12; 82:17-23). Ms. Guss is a paraplegic and is confined 
to a wheelchair. (Record ("R.") 305 P ; TT 79:18-80:13). When Ms. Guss would come to 
Cheryl for facial treatments, she would have someone carry her from her car to the inside, 
because there were steps going into the home. (TT 83:2-84:11). In the beginning, Ms. 
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Guss's boyfriend or a friend would bring Ms. Guss to Cheryl and carry her in so she could 
receive her treatment. (TT 83:9-10; 140:7-17). Then, Ms. Guss would call Cheryl upon her 
arrival, and at Ms. Guss's request, Ms. Edvalson and one of Ms. Edvalson's employees 
would go out to meet her and carry her inside. (TT 178:10-13). On a few occasions, Derek 
offered to carry Ms. Guss. (TT 84:12-19; 123:1-7; 383:19-25). 
On March 12,2004, Ms. Edvalson had a movable ramp installed over the stairs on the 
front of her home. (TT 141:8-12; 143:1-3). Ms. Edvalson had this done, in part, so it would 
be easier for Ms. Guss to enter and leave the premises. (TT 141:8-25). On that day, Ms. 
Guss received a facial treatment from Cheryl. (TT 99:10-14). 
At the time that Ms. Guss was receiving her facial treatment, Derek came home after 
he had been at school. (TT 385:14-387:4). As Derek arrived, he saw Ms. Guss (TT 389:3-6) 
and then he proceeded to eat lunch and watch TV. (TT 389:17-20). 
Upon Ms. Edvalson's request to her son that he help Ms. Guss out to her car (TT 
151:16-17; 152:9-11; 389:20-25), Derek offered to help Ms. Guss out to her car. (TT 390:3-
6). Derek proceeded to help Ms. Guss by holding on to the back of her wheelchair, and by 
slowly pushing her down the ramp (TT 152:23-24; 390:15-18). When the two of them 
reached Ms. Guss's car, which was parked in the driveway, Ms. Edvalson opened up the left 
driver's side door of Ms. Guss's vehicle, a Subaru. (TT 150:4-5; 392:1-7). 
At that point, Derek lifted Ms. Guss's wheelchair approximately one-quarter to one-
half inch so Ms. Guss could get into the seat of her car. (TT 95:22-24; 392:8-11; 398:5-22). 
Ms. Guss instructed Derek by saying, "Up, up, up!" (TT 159:3-8; 392:12-13). Ms. Guss 
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began sliding forward (TT 154:20-24), and although there is somewhat conflicting testimony 
about what exactly happened next, Derek either grabbed onto the wheels of the wheelchair 
(TT 165:20-24; 96:8-13) or he reached for Ms. Guss's armpits to support her (TT 155:3-4; 
183:20-22). Then Ms. Guss fell and hit her shins and knees on the driveway. (R. 305 ^  8; TT 
96:14-21; 392:21-393:1). 
As a result of Ms. Guss's fall, she sustained injuries. (R. 306 % 10; TT 99-105). 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 6, 2006, Ms. Guss filed a Complaint against Cheryl. (R. 1-6). Then, on 
January 16, 2007, Ms. Guss filed a First Amended Complaint against Cheryl and Derek for 
negligence. (R. 36-42). In the First Amended Complaint, Ms. Guss alleged: 
8. The Plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair as a result of a prior condition, 
was leaving the premises of the Defendant, Cheryl, Inc., when Defendant 
Derek Edvalson, acting for and on the behalf of Cheryl, Inc., attempted to 
pick up the wheelchair in order to put the Plaintiff in her vehicle. While 
raising [sic] wheelchair off of the ground, the wheelchair rotated and the 
Plaintiff was dropped onto the concrete driveway below, sustaining the injuries 
alleged herein. 
(R. 37 T| 8) (emphasis added). Ms. Guss's allegation that she was injured when Derek lifted 
the wheelchair is the only act that Ms. Guss alleges caused her injuries. (See R. 36-42). 
On March 9, 2007, Cheryl filed a motion for summary judgment (the "Summary 
Judgment Motion"), arguing that it could not be held vicariously liable for Ms. Guss's 
injuries, because Derek was not an employee of Cheryl. (R. 52-152). On May 21,2007, the 
district court held a hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 925; Hearing 
Transcript ("HT") 1-11) (a copy of the transcript from the hearing is attached hereto as 
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Exhibit A). At the hearing, Cheryl argued that the evidence showed that Derek was not an 
employee of Cheryl, and therefore, Cheryl could not be held liable. (HT 3:18-5:8). Ms. Guss 
argued that to the contrary, there was an issue of fact concerning whether there was an 
agency relationship between Cheryl and Derek. (HT 7:14-9:3). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment 
Motion, and stated: "I believe this is a factoral [sic] question for the jury to determine 
whether or not the son is a volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the 
business should be liable or could be liable. I'll therefore deny the motion for summary 
judgment." (HT 10:11-16; see Exhibit A) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court held 
that whether an agency relationship existed between Cheryl and Derek was a question of fact 
for the jury to decide. 
On April 1, 2008, Ms. Guss filed a Second Amended Complaint. (R. 304-07). The 
Second Amended Complaint added a cause of action against Derek, but it added no new 
claims or allegations against Cheryl. (R. 304-07). 
A four-day jury trial was held, beginning on March 2, 2009. (R. 810-11; 812A-815; 
855). Approximately one week before the trial, Ms. Guss settled her case against Derek. 
(See R. 812-13). 
At the trial, the jury was presented with the following factual issues: (1) whether 
Derek was negligent; and (2) whether Derek was a volunteer or an employee of Cheryl. Ms. 
Edvalson testified that Derek had never been an employee of Cheryl, nor had he ever 
provided facial treatments. (TT 177:8-15). Ms. Edvalson testified that occasionally, she 
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would ask her son to carry in to the house a heavy box or to shovel the driveway. (TT 
177:17-25). Furthermore, Derek testified that he had never been an employee of Cheryl, nor 
had he ever been paid by Ms. Guss to help her up the stairs when Ms. Guss would come for 
her treatments. (TT 383:3-5; 385:8-10). He testified that he was simply "willing to help 
people in need." (TT 385:12-13). 
After the conclusion of the presentation of witnesses at trial, the district court 
discussed with counsel each of the jury instructions and the Special Verdict form that he 
intended to give to the jury. (TT 467:5-471:6; 475:8-477:24). Cheryl had submitted 
proposed jury instructions and a proposed Special Verdict form approximately one week 
prior to the trial. (R. 676-749). The Record does not show that Ms. Guss submitted any jury 
instructions or a Special Verdict form. After the district court discussed with counsel the jury 
instructions (some of which were submitted by Cheryl (R. 676-749) and the rest of which 
were added by the district court) and Special Verdict form, the district court asked whether 
counsel had any objections, and counsel for Ms. Guss did not have any objections. (TT 
477:20-21). 
After the district court recited the jury instructions to the jury, counsel made their 
closing arguments. (TT 499-534). In Cheryl's counsel's closing argument, Cheryl said that 
if the jury found that Derek was a volunteer, then Cheryl could not be held liable. (TT 529:4-
13). Ms. Guss's counsel did not object to the statement in the closing argument and the 
district court did not offer a curative instruction. 
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On March 12, 2009, the jury rendered its Special Verdict and answered seven 
Interrogatories in the Special Verdict. (R. 865-67) (a copy of the Special Verdict is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B). The jury found that Derek was a volunteer in Interrogatory No. 6, 
which provided as follows: 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a 
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that defendant, Derek 
Edvalson, was an employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer. 
Employee 
Volunteer X 
(R. 866-67 T| 6). The jury, however, distributed the percentage of negligence among the 
following: 
A. Defendant, Cheryl, Inc. 42 % 
B. Defendant, Derek Edvalson 20 % 
C. Plaintiff, Teresa Guss 38 % 
(R. 866 H 5; see Exhibit B). 
Subsequently, on March 16, 2009, Cheryl filed a motion for the revision of the 
decision denying summary judgment, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)1 (the 
"Rule 54(b) Motion"). (R. 856-58). In the Rule 54(b) Motion, Cheryl argued that the issue 
of whether Derek was a volunteer or an employee had been resolved by the jury (R. 861 -64), 
1
 In Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit D, this Court stated that "Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure . . . allows a court to change its position with respect to any order or 
decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case." Id. at 1310 n.2 (citing Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). The Court noted that "a motion 
under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider its prior denial of a motion 
for summary judgment." Id. at 1311 (citing Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184-85; James Constructors, 
761P.2dat44n. 5). 
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and, because the district court had denied its Summary Judgment Motion solely on the basis 
that there was a factual issue on this point, the district court should reverse its earlier denial 
of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 861-64). 
Ms. Guss responded to the Rule 54(b) Motion by arguing, for the first time, that 
Cheryl was independently negligent. (R. 886-87). In a one-page Minute Entry dated June 
1, 2009, the Court denied Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion based on the following: "The Jury 
may have inferred from the evidence and a review of the Verdict Form that liability could 
be assessed against CHERYL, INC. independent of the status of Derek Edvalson." (R. 926) 
(emphasis added) (a copy of the Minute Entry is attached hereto as Exhibit C). Thus, the 
Court reconciled the inconsistent verdict by surmising that Cheryl's liability could be based 
on a theory of independent negligence. 
Judgment was ultimately entered against Cheryl on June 17, 2009. (R. 929-31). 
After Cheryl filed its Notice of Appeal (R. 940-41), Ms. Guss filed a motion for 
summary disposition, pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
arguing that the jury found Cheryl independently negligent, which rendered the vicarious 
issue "irrelevant and insubstantial." This Court denied Ms. Guss's motion for summary 
disposition on September 3, 2009. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Guss brought this lawsuit against Cheryl and Derek, after she sustained injuries 
when Derek was helping her into her car after she had received a facial treatment from 
Cheryl. Ms. Guss pleaded a claim for vicarious liability. The district court held a hearing 
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on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, in which Cheryl argued that Derek was not an 
employee of Cheryl and therefore, it could not be held vicariously liable for the torts of 
Derek. The district court denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion on the ground that 
there existed an issue of fact concerning whether there was an employment relationship 
between Cheryl and Derek. 
After a jury trial, the jury rendered its Special Verdict and found that Derek was not 
an employee of Cheryl, but was merely a volunteer offering to assist Ms. Guss to her car. 
The jury, however, apportioned fault against Cheryl. As a result, Cheryl filed a Rule 54(b) 
Motion, arguing that the factual finding that Derek was a volunteer presented a "different 
light" or "different circumstances," by which the district court should reverse its denial of 
Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. In response to the motion, Ms. Guss argued that the 
jury found Cheryl independently negligent. The district court did not necessarily agree with 
Ms. Guss, but stated that the jury, after reviewing the evidence and the Special Verdict form, 
may have inferred that liability could be assessed against Cheryl. On that basis, the district 
court denied Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion and entered judgment against Cheryl. The district 
court essentially ignored the jury's finding that Derek was a volunteer, and declined to give 
it any legal effect. 
Cheryl respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial of 




I. THE JURY'S FINDING THAT DEREK WAS A VOLUNTEER 
PRECLUDES MS. GUSS FROM RECOVERING AGAINST CHERYL 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
In this lawsuit, Ms. Guss sought recovery against Cheryl on the theory that Cheryl was 
the employer of Derek (the adult son of the owner of Cheryl), and therefore, Cheryl should 
be held liable for Derek's negligence. Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, Cheryl can 
only be held liable if it employed Derek. Because the jury found that Derek was not an 
employee of Cheryl, but that he was a mere volunteer that offered to help Ms. Guss, Cheryl 
cannot be held liable for Derek's negligence. 
A. Under the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability an Employer 
Cannot Be Held Liable for a Volunteer's Negligent Acts 
It is well-settled law that an employer cannot be held liable for a tortfeasor's 
negligence unless the tortfeasor is an employee, and the tortfeasor was acting within the 
scope of employment during the time the tort was committed. See, e.g., Glover v. Boy Scouts 
of America, 923 P.2d 1383,1385 (Utah 1996) (stating that the elements of vicarious liability 
are that an employer-employee relationship existed and that the employee was acting within 
the scope of his employment). Whether an employment relationship exists is often a question 
of fact, and is determined by factors including compensation, right to control, intent, and 
context of the business. See Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational Ass fn, 845 
P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1992). 
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B. The Jury's Finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a 
Volunteer Resolved the Factual Issue on Which the District 
Court Denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion 
In Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, it argued that because there was no evidence 
that Derek was an employee of Cheryl, Ms. Guss's claim against Cheryl should be dismissed. 
Ms. Guss opposed the motion, arguing that whether an agency relationship exists is a 
question of fact for the jury. The district court agreed with Ms. Guss, and denied the 
Summary Judgment Motion on the basis that there existed an issue of fact regarding whether 
Derek was an employee of Cheryl or a volunteer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court stated: "I believe this is a factoral [sic] question for the jury to determine 
whether or not the son is a volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the 
business should be liable or could be liable."2 (HT 10:11-16; see Exhibit A). The Court 
therefore denied the Summary Judgment Motion. 
The jury returned its Special Verdict, and found that Derek was a volunteer in 
Interrogatory No. 6, which provided: 
2
 At the May 21, 2007 hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, the Court 
speculated as to whether Cheryl could be held liable if the jury found that Derek was a 
gratuitous servant. The Court stated: "Why can't the corporation be liable because the 
accident, even if he's not employee? Let's say he's just a servant non-paid, a gratuitous 
servant, so to speak that does things at the request of the corporation and as a result of a 
request to him something happens and the corporation - why should the corporation be held 
liable?" (HT 5:9-14). 
Ms. Guss, however, did not pursue a claim that Derek was acting as Cheryl's 
"gratuitous servant." Ms. Guss did not request that the jury be instructed on facts necessary 
to support the conclusion that Derek was a gratuitous servant. Accordingly, any such claim 
is waived. See Gourdin, 845 P.2d at 244 n. 1 (the "gratuitous servant" document was not 
addressed on appeal because it was not raised at trial). 
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Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a 
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that defendant, Derek 
Edvalson, was an employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer. 
Employee 
Volunteer X 
(R. 866-67 |^ 6; see Exhibit B). Implicit in Interrogatory No. 6 is that Derek was not an 
employee of Cheryl. The jury's factual finding conclusively determined "whether or not the 
son is a volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the business should be 
liable or could be liable." {See HT 10:11-16; see Exhibit A). The district court, therefore, 
should have reversed its ruling on CheryFs Summary Judgment Motion, as set forth below. 
C. The District Court Should Have Reversed its Ruling on 
Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, Pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in Light of the 
Jury's Finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a 
Volunteer 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "allows a court to change its position 
with respect to any order or decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case." 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1184-85 (Utah 1993)). A copy of the Trembly decision is attached 
hereto as Exhibit D. Rule 54(b) states, in pertinent part, that 
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties . . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). "Thus, a motion under Rule 54(b) is a proper vehicle to ask the court 
to reconsider its prior denial of a motion for summary judgment/' Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311 
(citing Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184-85). 
The factors a court may consider in reconsidering a prior ruling when 
(1) the matter is presented in a "different light" or under "different 
circumstances;" (2) there has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party 
offers new evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does not 
reconsider the prior ruling: (5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an 
issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the court. 
Id. at 11 (citing State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 n. 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis 
added). See also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 990 P.2d 945,958-59 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999) (same). 
The jury's finding that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, and instead, was 
a volunteer, as set forth in Interrogatory No. 6 of the Special Verdict, resolved the legal 
question of whether Cheryl is vicariously liable for Derek's negligence.3 The district court's 
earlier denial of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion was based on this precise factual 
question. Thus, after the trial and prior to the entry of judgment, Cheryl filed a Rule 54(b) 
Motion, arguing that the district court should reverse its decision on Cheryl's Summary 
Judgment Motion4 in light of the jury's finding. {See R. 856-64; 891-905). 
3
 The jury found that Derek was negligent in Interrogatory No. 3 of the Special Verdict. 
(R.866U3). 
4
 After the May 21, 2007 hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, the Court 
directed Ms. Guss's counsel to prepare an order. Ms. Guss's counsel did not submit a 
proposed order denying Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. Therefore, Cheryl seeks 
(continued...) 
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The jury's answer to Interrogatory No. 6 constituted a "different light" or "different 
circumstances" within the meaning of Trembly. The Summary Judgment Motion was 
decided based on the evidence of whether or not Derek was an agent or employee of Cheryl 
and, because there was an issue of fact regarding the foregoing, the motion was denied. 
After the trial, it was undisputed that there was no employment relationship between Cheryl 
and Derek. 
In the district court's Minute Entry, dated June 1, 2009, by which it denied Cheryl's 
Rule 54(b) Motion {see Exhibit C), it did not address Cheryl's argument that the jury's 
finding presented a "different light" or "different circumstances" by which to reverse the 
district court's decision denying the Summary Judgment Motion. Furthermore, the district 
court never addressed the legal effect of Interrogatory No. 6. The district court's denial of 
Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion effectively renders Interrogatory No. 6 superfluous - having no 
legal effect whatsoever, which is set forth in greater detail in Part III. 
In conclusion, it was error for the district court to deny Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion. 
Cheryl requests that the Court reverse the district court's decision. 
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE JURY TRIAL WAS TO RESOLVE THE 
FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER CHERYL COULD BE HELD 
VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR DEREK'S NEGLIGENCE 
Ms. Guss filed this lawsuit against Cheryl in an attempt to hold Cheryl vicariously 
liable for Derek's negligence. Again, at the hearing on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion, 
4
 (...continued) 
reversal of the Court's decision, which is referenced in the transcript of the hearing. {See HT 10:11-
16; see Exhibit A). 
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Cheryl argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for Derek's negligence because the 
evidence showed that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl. The district court, however, 
disagreed with Cheryl, and held that there was an issue of fact regarding whether Derek was 
or was not an employee of Cheryl. On that basis, Ms. Guss's claim against Cheryl was not 
dismissed, and Ms. Guss's vicarious liability claim against Cheryl proceeded to trial. After 
the jury found that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, thus resolving whether Cheryl 
could be held vicariously liable, the district court erroneously entered judgment against 
Cheryl on the notion that Cheryl "could be" held independently negligent. (See R. 926; see 
Exhibit C). 
A. The District Court Confirmed that the Sole Issue at Trial 
Was Whether Derek Was an Employee of Cheryl or a 
Volunteer 
On January 16,2007, Ms. Guss filed her First Amended Complaint, which alleges that 
"Derek Edvalson, acting for and on behalf of Cheryl, Inc." caused injuries to Ms. Guss 
when he raised her wheelchair off of the ground and she was dropped. (R. 37 % 8) (emphasis 
added). 
Shortly thereafter, Cheryl filed its Summary Judgment Motion, arguing that Ms. 
Guss's vicarious liability claim against Cheryl must be dismissed because Derek was not an 
employee of Cheryl. At the hearing on CheryPs Summary Judgment Motion, Cheryl's 
counsel stated: "[W]e have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff 
has a burden to show that Cheryl, Inc. is vicariously liable as the employer and that the 
evidence is insufficient. . . ." (HT 4:8-11; see Exhibit A). Ms. Guss's counsel responded 
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by arguing that there was evidence that Derek was an employee of Cheryl, based on evidence 
that he shoveled the sidewalk and that occasionally, he was paid for doing some things. (HT 
8:14-22; see Exhibit A). The district court was not convinced that the evidence was 
conclusive that there was no employment relationship between Cheryl and Derek. 
Accordingly, the district court denied Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion and stated: "I 
believe this is a factoral [sic] question for the jury to determine whether or not the son is a 
volunteer helping his mother in her business, and therefore the business should be liable or 
could be liable. I'll therefore deny the motion for summary judgment." (HT 10:11-16; see 
Exhibit C) (emphasis added). 
Throughout the course of litigation, Cheryl conducted discovery and prepared for trial 
in a manner consistent with what the district court had ordered at the hearing on the Summary 
Judgment Motion. 
Approximately one week prior to the trial, Cheryl submitted a Special Verdict form, 
and included Interrogatory No. 6 regarding whether Derek was an employee of Cheryl. No 
objection to Interrogatory No. 6 was made {see TT 477:20-21). And, Ms. Guss's counsel did 
not submit a proposed Special Verdict form or a jury instruction, explaining the legal effect 
of Derek being a volunteer. Similarly, the district court did not include any interrogatory in 
the Special Verdict form or a jury instruction regarding the effect of Derek being a volunteer. 
At the trial, Cheryl's counsel questioned witnesses, including Cheryl Edvalson and 
Derek, regarding whether Derek was an employee of Cheryl. For example, Cheryl's counsel 
asked Cheryl Edvalson whether Derek had ever been employed by Cheryl, and whether he 
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had ever provided facials or skin care services, to which Ms. Edvalson responded negatively. 
(TT 177:10-16). Cheryl's counsel asked Derek whether he was ever employed by Cheryl, 
and, he testified that although he would occasionally help out his mother by mowing the lawn 
and shoveling the front walk, he was never employed by Cheryl. (TT 383:3-15). 
Then, during closing arguments, Cheryl's counsel said that if the jury found that 
Derek was a volunteer, then Cheryl could not be held liable. (TT 529:4-13). Ms. Guss's 
counsel did not object to the statement, nor did the district court offer a curative instruction. 
After the jury deliberated, it returned its Special Verdict, and found in Interrogatory 
No. 6 that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl. (R. 866-67 ^ 6). 
Then, in response to Cheryl's post-trial Rule 54(b) Motion, Ms. Guss argued, for the 
first time, and the district court held, that Cheryl "could be" held liable for independent 
negligence. (R. 26) (emphasis added). The district court did not offer any explanation for 
this conclusory statement. Nor did the district court attempt to address the effect of 
Interrogatory No. 6. 
Thereafter, judgment was entered against Cheryl based on the district court's 
unsupported and speculative post-verdict allegation that Cheryl could be found independently 
negligent. Most importantly, the district court's entry of judgment based on independent 
negligence directly contradicted what it had told counsel at the hearing on Cheryl's Summary 
Judgment Motion - that Ms. Guss's claim against Cheryl was to proceed to trial to resolve 
whether Cheryl could be held vicariously liable for Derek's negligence. 
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B. Ms. Guss Did Not Allege that Cheryl was "Independently 
Negligent" Until After the Jury Reached a Special Verdict 
In Ms. Guss's First Amended Complaint, filed January 16,2007, the only negligent 
act alleged of is set forth below: 
8. The Plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair as a result of a prior condition, 
was leaving the premises of the Defendant, Cheryl, Inc., when Defendant 
Derek Edvalson, acting for and on the behalf of Cheryl, Inc., attempted to pick 
up the wheelchair in order to put the Plaintiff in her vehicle. While raising 
[sic] wheelchair off of the ground, the wheelchair rotated and the Plaintiff 
was dropped onto the concrete driveway below, sustaining the injuries alleged 
herein. 
(R. 37 \ 8) (emphasis added). Ms. Guss's Second Amended Complaint, filed April 1,2008 
- long after the Court ruled on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion,5 added no new claims 
or allegations against Cheryl. Therefore, the only alleged negligence is that Derek was 
negligent when he attempted to raise the wheelchair off the ground, which caused Ms. Guss 
to fall to the concrete driveway, causing injuries. (R. 305 \ 8). And, the only allegation 
against Cheryl is that Derek was "actingfor and on the behalf of Cheryl, Inc." an allegation 
that Cheryl is vicariously liable for Derek's allegedly negligent act. (R. 305 Tj 8) (emphasis 
added). 
5
 As set forth above, the issue on Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion was whether Derek 
was a volunteer or employee of Cheryl, and based on the foregoing, whether Cheryl could 
be held vicariously liable for Derek's negligence. This Summary Judgment Motion was 
denied on May 21, 2007. Ms. Guss had plenty of time between May 2007 and April 2008 
(when the Second Amended Complaint was filed) to consider whether to bring an 
independent negligence claim against Cheryl. Ms. Guss's decision not to was due to the fact 
that this case was really a claim against Derek, and Ms. Guss was merely attempting to hold 
Cheryl liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
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Ms. Guss did not allege that Cheryl was independently negligent until after the trial 
when she responded to Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion.6 (See R. 887). 
Ms. Guss, in her pleadings and throughout the course of litigation, did not provide 
Cheryl with any notice that it was entitled to recover against Cheryl on a theory of 
independent negligence. See Canfield v. Lay ton City, 2005 UT 60, % 14,122 P.3d 622 (2005) 
(a plaintiff is required to give a defendant "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of 
the claim") (citing Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)).7 
Courts have considered whether a plaintiff had properly provided notice to a 
defendant of an independent negligence claim (in addition to a claim for vicarious liability), 
and thus, whether the defendant could be held liable for independent negligence. In 
Longneckerv. Loyola University Medical Ctr., 891 N.E.2d 954 (111. App. Ct. 2008), an action 
was brought against a surgeon and a hospital for negligence after an unsuccessful heart 
transplant. Id. at 956-57. The jury found, among other things, that the hospital had 
committed institutional negligence (independent negligence). Id. at 956. On appeal, the 
hospital argued that it could not be held liable for institutional negligence because the 
plaintiffs complaint only alleged vicarious liability for the surgeon's malpractice. Id. at 964. 
After reviewing the complaint, the Court held that the plaintiff did plead sufficient facts to 
6
 In Ms. Guss's memorandum in opposition to Cheryl's 54(b) Motion, Ms. Guss does not 
specify any facts on which Cheryl could be held independently negligent. (See R. 881-90). 
7
 Furthermore, if a claim or defense is not pleaded, it is waived. See, e.g., Devine v. Cook, 
279 P.2d 1073, 1078-79 (Utah 1955) (it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on 
contributory negligence because the defendants did not plead contributory negligence). 
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put the hospital on notice of this separate theory of liability because the plaintiff alleged that 
the hospital "failed to properly test, inspect, and diagnose the donor heart, and that both 
defendants otherwise deviated from the standard of care." Id. at 965 (internal citation 
omitted). See also Voorhees v. University of Pennsylvania, 1997 WL 1433733 (Pa. Com. PL 
1997), 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 302,316 (a hospital could be held independently negligent because 
there was "specific mention [in the complaint] of negligence in the defendants' failure to 
'prophylactically treat' the plaintiff'). Unlike the facts pleaded in the complaints in 
Longnecker and Voorhees, Ms. Guss wholly failed to plead any facts to put Cheryl on notice 
that it sought relief against Cheryl for independent negligence. Again, the only factual 
allegation of negligence is that when Derek lifted Ms. Guss's wheelchair, Ms. Guss was 
dropped and she fell on the concrete driveway. (R. 305 |^ 8). 
In Busch v. Flangas, 837 P.2d 438 (Nev. 1992), the Supreme Court of Nevada dealt 
with a plaintiff that pleaded the opposite of that which Ms. Guss pleaded. In Busch, the 
plaintiff pleaded independent negligence against the defendant, and did not plead vicarious 
liability. Id. at 440. Because the plaintiff "tardily mentionfedj 'the theory of respondeat 
superior,' but neither the complaint nor the [summary judgment] motion documents 
supported] this kind of claim of liability," the Court held that the plaintiff could not recover 
under a theory of vicarious liability. Id. at 441 n. 1 (emphasis added). 
Like the plaintiff in Busch, Ms. Guss's post-verdict allegation that Cheryl was 
independently negligent was tardy. Thus, Cheryl cannot be held liable for independent 
negligence. 
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III. THE DENIAL OF THE RULE 54(b) MOTION DEFEATED THE 
EFFECT OF THE JURY'S FINDING IN INTERROGATORY NO. 6 OF 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT 
Cheryl included Interrogatory No. 6 in its Special Verdict form and Ms. Guss did not 
object to this interrogatory. (TT 477:20-21). The district court included Interrogatory No. 
6 without hesitation. After the jury found that Derek was a volunteer, but also apportioned 
fault against Cheryl, Cheryl filed its Rule 54(b) Motion, arguing that Ms. Guss's claim 
against Cheryl should be dismissed.8 The district court denied Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion 
by stating in a one-page Minute Entry: "The Jury may have inferred from the evidence and 
a review of the Verdict Form that liability could be assessed against CHERYL, INC. 
independent of the status of Derek Edvalson." (R. 926; see Exhibit C) (emphasis added). 
The district court's attempt to explain the legal effect of Interrogatory No. 6 by stating that 
liability could be assessed against Cheryl is wholly inadequate. In order to enter judgment 
against Cheryl, the district court had to describe the evidence showing that Cheryl was 
independently negligent, consistent with the finding that Derek was a volunteer, not that it 
could be.9 
8
 Again, Cheryl argued in its Rule 54(b) Motion that the district court should reverse its 
denial of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion in light of the jury's finding that Derek was 
a volunteer. (R. 856-64). 
9
 In the case of a special verdict, it is the jury's duty to decide the facts of the case. 
Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, K 16,47 P.3d 76. "The [trial] court then applies the 
law to the facts as found and renders a verdict." Id. (citing Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric 
Ass 'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970). Thus, neither the jury or district court conclusively 
found or decided that Cheryl was independently negligent. 
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More importantly, the district court's denial of Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion defeats 
the legal effect of Interrogatory No. 6. Cheryl was "entitled to have the benefit of the jury's 
[finding] on issues of fact." MelHardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913,917 
(Utah 1979). See also Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (same). Furthermore, "it [was] not the trial court's prerogative to disregard 
or nullify [the jury's finding] by making findings of his own." Id. 
In First Security Bank of Utah, Natl Ass 'n v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886 
(Utah 1969), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E, the defendants deposited a 
check with the plaintiff bank, which was dishonored by the bank. Id. at 887. When the 
check was dishonored, the bank charged the check amount against the defendants' account, 
thus creating a large overdraft. Id. After a dispute arose between the parties, the bank sued 
the defendants, and the defendants argued that the bank bore the loss because the bank (1) 
did not provide the required notice of the dishonored check; and (2) there was an accord and 
satisfaction. Id. Then, although the "jury answered interrogatories favorable to defendants 
on the issues of failure to give notice and accord and satisfaction," the trial court rendered 
judgment for the plaintiff. Id. 
Specifically, the jury found that the bank was negligent because it failed to notify the 
defendants within the time prescribed by law that the check was dishonored, and that there 
was a complete accord and satisfaction. Id. at 888. The Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
The difficulty which exists in this case is that, notwithstanding the findings of 
the jury in favor of defendants as set forth above, which the trial court stated 
that he 'accepted,' 'approved,' and found 'true and correct,' he nevertheless 
awarded the plaintiff credit for the amount of the check. This was done on the 
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basis of the court's 'further finding' that the defendants knew or should have 
known of [the drawer's] financial instability and, in addition, that they were 
kept fully informed of the plaintiff bank's continuing efforts to collect the 
check. 
The effect of this 'further finding' was actually to contravene the finding made 
by the jury that the plaintiff bank 'was negligent because it failed to give [the 
defendants] notice in the time prescribed by law, or a reasonable time, about 
the [check] not being honored . . . . The same observation is pertinent to the 
action of the trial court with respect to the issue of accord and satisfaction. 
Id. at 889. 
The Court explained that "[i]t is recognized that where a case is submitted to the jury 
on special verdicts, the trial court may make corrections of obvious errors or defects therein 
" Id. "But when a party has demanded a trial by jury he is entitled to have the jury find 
the facts, and it is not the trial courts prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith 
and thereby defeat the effect of the jury Js findings." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment against the defendants. Id. 
In Mel Hardman Productions, 604 P.2d 913, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit F, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract for failing to deliver a 
motion picture to plaintiff. Id. at 914. The defendant defended on the ground that he did 
perform the contract by delivering film to the plaintiff, and he also filed a counterclaim for 
profits that he should have received after the film was sold and distributed by the plaintiff. 
Id. After a trial, the jury returned its answers to interrogatories that were favorable to the 
defendant - that the defendant did not breach the contract, and that plaintiff had used and 
distributed the film. Id. The trial court, however, concluded that the defendant was not 
entitled to any residuals or compensation for the distribution of the film. Id. at 914-15, 
9I6635vi 23 
The Supreme Court of Utah stated that "the trial court decided to disregard the 
findings of the jury and to rule in favor of the plaintiff on the issues in dispute as a matter 
of law." Id. at 916 (emphasis added). The Court cited Lundahl by stating that "it is not the 
trial court's prerogative to disregard or nullify" the findings of the jury. Id. at 917. The 
Court reinstated the jury's finding, which entitled the defendant to recover on his 
counterclaim. Id. at 918. 
The district court, after denying Cheryl' s Summary Judgment Motion on the sole basis 
that an issue of fact regarding the employment relationship between Cheryl and Derek, 
wholly disregarded the jury's finding that Derek was a volunteer. It was not the district 
court's prerogative to make findings inconsistent with what the jury found in Interrogatory 
No. 6 and to defeat the legal effect of the jury's finding that Derek was not employed by 
Cheryl. See Lundahl 454 P.2d at 889. 
IV. IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT DENIES CHERYL'S REQUEST 
TO REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF CHERYL'S 
RULE 54(b) MOTION, THE COURT SHOULD ORDER A NEW TRIAL 
Cheryl argues above, particularly in Part I Section C, that it was error for the district 
court to deny Cheryl's Rule 54(b) Motion and ignore the jury's finding that Derek was a 
volunteer. After the jury found that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, there was no 
longer a "genuine issue as to any material fact," under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The factual finding that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl presented the 
Summary Judgment Motion in a "different light" or "different circumstances" under the 
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meaning of Trembly. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 131L Thus, Cheryl requests that the Court 
reverse the district court's denial of Cheryl's Summary Judgment Motion. 
Furthermore, this Court should reverse the district court's entry of judgment against 
Cheryl because it disregarded the jury's finding in Interrogatory No. 6. See Part III above; 
see Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d at 889 (the Court reversed the judgment); MelHardman 
Productions, 604 P.2d at 918 (the Court reinstated the jury's finding and reversed the 
judgment). 
However, to the extent that this Court finds that the jury reached an inconsistent 
verdict, the Court should order a new trial. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 
396-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (acknowledging that in the case of an inconsistent verdict, a 
new trial must be ordered). The jury found that Derek was not an employee of Cheryl, but 
also apportioned fault against Cheryl. These findings of fact are inconsistent under the 
doctrine of vicarious liability. See Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 
869 (Utah 1981) ("[A] jury's answers to special interrogatories must, if at all possible, be 
read harmoniously . . . . " ) . 
A trial court cannot "defeat the effect of the jury's findings." Lundahl, 454 P. 2d at 
889. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit has stated that "[tjhere is no priority of one answer over 
another " Heno v. Sprint/United Management Co., 208 F.3d 847, 854 (citing Freeman 
v. Chicago Park Dist., 189F.3d613,615(7thCir. 1999)). The Court should therefore order 
a new trial because of the inconsistency in the Special Verdict. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 895 
P.2d at 396-97; Bonin v. Tour West, Inc., 896 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Cheryl respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
district court's denial of Cheryl, Inc. 's Motion for Revision of the Decision Denying 
Summary Judgment, or, in the alternative, order a new trial. 
DATED this /} day of January, 2010. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Bv: / [ iteA^ct^ p. (l/jU 
J. Angus Edwards 
Jessica P. Wilde 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MAY 21, 2007 
2 HONORABLE L.A. DEVER, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Be seated. This is the matter of Guss 
7 v. Derek Edvalson, 060903837. Counsel, enter your 
8 appearances for the record. 
9 MR. RAWLINGS: Yes, Your Honor, good afternoon, 
10 William Rawlings for the plaintiff. 
11 MR. TAYLOR: Good afternoon, my name is Kumen 
12 Taylor, I'm for the defendant Derek Edvalson. 
13 MR. EDWARDS: Angus Edwards for the defendant 
14 Cheryl, Inc. 
15 THE COURT: This is on for a motion for summary 
16 judgment. Cheryl, Inc. is the moving party. You may 
17 proceed. 
18 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you, Your Honor. The claims 
19 against Cheryl, Inc. are for vicarious liability. Derek 
20 Edvalson was added as a defendant somewhat recently and so 
21 now we have both the alleged principal and agent as 
22 defendants. For a while we only had the purported employer 
23 as a defendant. That has been remedied. 
24 Cheryl, Inc. operates an in-home salon in a home 
25 that's owned by David and Cheryl Edvalson and the defendant 
1 that was added was their son, Derek Edvalson, back at the 
2 time of the accident, March 12, 2004 when he was 21 years old 
3 now; now he's 24. 
4 The plaintiff was a customer of the salon for 
5 approximately three to four years before the accident and is 
6 in a wheelchair. . So this accident involves Derek Edvalson, 
7 the son, helping the plaintiff into her car after she 
8 finished at the in-home salon. And we have moved for summary 
9 judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff has a burden to 
10 show that Cheryl, Inc. is vicariously liable as the employer 
11 and that the evidence is insufficient and we're really only 
12 relying on one case in Utah, Glover v. Boy Scouts of America. 
13 And the reason we're relying on that case is the court did 
14 two things that are important for this case. The court 
15 granted summary judgment and as the Court knows in personal 
16 injury cases, negligence in particular, summary judgment is 
17 not commonly granted. But when it comes to an employment 
18 issue, Glover allowed summary judgment to be granted. 
19 The second reason we're relying on Glover is that 
20 in that case there was all kinds of evidence of an employment 
21 relationship because one of the parties to the employment 
22 relationship sought to have an employment relationship 
23 declared. And that is categorically different from this case 
24 where the employer claims that it was not the employer of Mr. 
25 Edvalson at the time he was helping the plaintiff. He was 
1 just the son helping his mom. And the son doesn't say he's 
2 an employee at the time he was helping the plaintiff into the 
3 car. So those are the really operative facts in this case, 
4 the operative law and I think the only thing I want to do for 
5 purposes of oral argument is just go through a little bit of 
6 Derek Edvalson's deposition testimony because that deposition 
7 was taken after my motion for summary judgment was filed. It 
8 has been attached to one of the opposing memoranda. 
9 THE COURT: Why can't the corporation be liable 
10 because the accident, even if he's not employee? Let's say 
11 he's just a servant non-paid, a gratuitous servant, so to 
12 speak that does things at the request of the corporation and 
13 as a result of a request to him something happens and the 
14 corporation - why shouldn't the corporation be liable? 
15 MR. EDWARDS: Well, I would agree with the Court on 
16 Mr. Edvalson doesn't have to be paid. He can be a volunteer 
17 employee. That's clearly what the Glover case said. So 
18 payment, although a factor to be considered, is by no means 
19 dispositive. And there's some case law cited in my memoranda 
20 and in the other parties' memoranda where the Gordon v. Scara 
21 case, I think is how it's pronounced, but for example where a 
22 young boy was injured as a volunteer and in exchange for 
23 mowing lawns he was admitted into this recreational facility, 
24 you know, that he was a voluntary employee was the issue in 
25 that case. So the payment isn't the issue, so I would agree 
1 with the Court on that issue. I also agree on the second 
2 point the Court is making. 
3 Under the Atkinson v. State Line Casino case that I 
4 cited, a pure volunteer, not even an employment relationship, 
5 a pure volunteer can also be liable. In other words, we can 
6 take it one step farther and perhaps to the court's question 
7 we could say Mr. Edvalson wasn't even an employee, wasn't 
8 even a volunteer, but as a volunteer helped this woman on 
9 behalf of the business, the business can still be liable. 
10 And the Atkinson case presents the kind of case where that's 
11 probably clearly appropriate. I don't want to go into the 
12 facts in too much detail unless the Court has questions about 
13 it, but essentially an intoxicated patron of the casino is 
14 sort of in the safety of the casino - in fact, I think this 
15 was this court's case if I remember right. I won't go into 
16 the facts of that case too much, but just to say if you have 
17 a person and you make them worse off, even as a pure 
18 volunteer, there's no payment, there's no consideration, 
19 there's no exchange at all, if you leave them worse off you 
20 are subject to liability for purposes of summary judgment 
21 where those kinds of issues should be allowed to go to a 
22 jury. 
23 THE COURT: So why shouldn't this be allowed to go 
24 to the jury then? 
2 5 MR. EDWARDS: I'd just step back and again and say 
1 in this case unlike the other cases we've been talking about 
2 where one of the parties to this relationship, meaning either 
3 Derek Edvalson, the son, or Cheryl, Inc. and his mother is 
4 the principal, those two parties both say there isn't an 
5 employment relationship, there isn't a volunteer relationship 
6 on behalf of the business in their deposition testimony. We 
7 don't have a similar kind of factual basis like we have in 
8 these other cases. That's the distinction. We have an 
9 outsider, a patron who is saying there is an employment 
10 relationship. The people involved in the relationship are 
11 saying no, there was no such relationship. And that's in a 
12 nutshell what I'm saying. Thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Rawlings? 
14 MR. RAWLINGS: Very briefly, Your Honor, I'd just 
15 say that, you know, whether he says there's an employment 
16 relationship or not, I don't think mere words should be the 
17 deciding factor. Certainly the actions of the parties I 
18 think are more important. He was - Derek was responding to 
19 his mother's request in furtherance of her business. This 
20 was a business patron, a business invitee if you will. I 
21 don't see how there isn't an issue here as to whether or not 
22 there's an agency relationship, some sort of - it's certainly 
23 more than volunteer if somebody requests assistance, and this 
24 is not the first time. This had happened several other 
25 times, so I don't think there's any question that there's an 
1 issue here of whether or not general negligence principles 
2
 twould apply or agency relationship would apply. This isn't 
3 somebody who's walking on the street and she says come over 
4 here and could you help this lady into her car. This is her 
5 son and she says come over here, he came home from school and 
6 she's asking to assist. In fact, in the past he's actually 
7 picked up my client who has issues of a quadriplegia and 
8 carry her from her car into the business and back. In this 
9 particular case they were working with a wheelchair. So this 
10 seems to be the first time that this had occurred. I don't 
11 understand why he was even involved if there is a wheelchair 
12 to get her to her car, but that's what happened on this 
13 particular day. 
14 I mean, I can go into all the details about the 
15 governing board who cleaned off the sidewalk has testified in 
16 the deposition he cleaned off the sidewalk of the snow so 
17 people could get in and out of the business home residence; 
18 that he would get paid once in a while for doing some of 
19 these things he would have stock - foot stock that would be 
20 delivered and take downstairs, trying to show these kind of 
21 little issues that might show some sort of an employment 
22 relationship, but frankly I think the issue was so clear I 
23 really don't understand why we're here. I think if I ask 
24 somebody to do something for my business and that person is 
25 not trained, they fail, they do something wrong, then I think 
8 
1 a jury has got a right to determine whether or not I should 
2 be held accountable for that. So that I suppose in a 
3 nutshell is where I'm coming from. Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Taylor? 
5 MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I did not file an 
6 opposition to the motion for summary judgment because I came 
7 in so late. All the discovery was done, the motion was filed 
8 three days after I filed an answer. I filed a Rule 56(f) 
9 motion and affidavit. I don't know if you want me to argue 
10 that or wait on that. 
11 THE COURT: Very well, we can just wait. 
12 MR. TAYLOR: Okay. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, anything else you want to 
14 say? 
15 MR. EDWARDS: Just two last comments, if I may. I 
16 mentioned earlier I was going to comment on two pieces of 
17 testimony Derek Edvalson's deposition, I'm just going to 
18 briefly do that. The examples where Derek Edvalson himself 
19 said that he was an employee. He was asked by Mr. Rawlings 
20 the question, you didn't give any specific money - "You 
21 didn't get any specific money for assisting Teresa, did you?" 
22 He answered no. "Any benefit that was given to you for that 
23 specific activity, did you gain anything by that?" His 
24 answer was, monentarily, no. And then Mr. Rawlings asked 
25 him, "Any other way?" And his answer was, "Just helping out 
1 a fellow human being, trying to do the right thing. I guess 
2 it gave me a good feeling to help someone else, if that's a 
3 benefit.7' 
4 And then the other even shorter testimony is when 
5 Mr. Edvalson was asked about whether he received instructions 
6 about helping the plaintiff into the car, he testified 
7 Teresa, the plaintiff - that's the plaintiff - "Teresa always 
8 asked me or just told me what to do. It was never - my mom 
9 just had her mouth shut." Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Well, in this matter I believe that the 
11 objections made by the defendant are well taken. I believe 
12 this is a factoral question for the jury to determine whether 
13 or not the son is a volunteer helping his mother in her 
14 business, and therefore the business should be liable or 
15 could be liable. I'll therefore deny the motion for summary 
16 judgment. 
17 MR. RAWLINGS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: What's the status of this case now? Do 
19 you want to get together and work out a new discovery plan 
20 since you have a new party involved? 
21 MR. TAYLOR: That's what I intend to do, Your 
22 Honor, is try to get a new discovery plan so I can do some 
23 discovery on these issues. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. So you need to get together and 
25 work out one. Okay. 
10 
1 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you. 
2 MR. RAWLINGS: Thank you. 
3 MR. TAYLOR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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CASE NO. 060903837 
Judge L. A. Dever 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is 
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that 
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any damages assessed 
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant, Cheryl, Inc., was negligent in performing any one or more of the specific 
acts of negligence alleged by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes y No 
2. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that negligence of the defendant, Cheryl, Inc., was either the sole proximate cause or a 
contributing proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 
ANSWER: Yes \ / No 
3. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant, Derek Edvalson was negligent in performing any one or more if 
the specific acts of negligence alleged by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes / No 
4. Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant, Derek Edvalson, was either the sole proximate cause or a contributing 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 
ANSWER: Yes ]/ No 
5. If you have answered Questions 2 and 4, <cyes," then, and only the, answer the 
following question: Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 100%, what 
percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Defendant, Cheryl, Inc. *"fZ~ % 
B. Defendant, Derek Edvalson 2^0 % 
C. Plaintiff, Teresa Guss % 
TOTAL 100 % 
6. Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a 
2 
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that Defendant, Derek Edvalson, was an 
employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer. 
Employee 
Volunteer y 
7 If you have answered either or both of questions 2 and 4 "Yes", state the amount 
of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the 
plaintiffs injuries. If neither question was answered "Yes," do not answer this question. 
Special Damages: 
A. Past Special Damages 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 




CHERYL, INC. and DEREK EDVALSON, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 060903837 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendant CHERYL, INC.'s 
Motion to Renew Motion for Summary Judgment and Objection to the Proposed 
Judgment submitted by the Plaintiff. 
The Court has reviewed the memoranda of the parties. Defendant's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Jury may have inferred from the 
evidence and a review of the Verdict Form that liability could be assessed against 
CHERYL, INC. independent of the status of Derek Edvaison. The Special Verdict Form, 
signed by the Jury, assessed liability to CHERYL, INC. 
Defendant's objections to the costs listed in the Judgment are well taken. The 
amount of costs is limited to $405.36, as outlined in the Defendant's memorandum. 
Plaintiff is directed to prepare a revised Judgment in the amount of $188,813.49. 
Dated 28th day of May, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry dated 
this Q\^  " day of May, 2009, postage prepaid, to the following: 
J. Angus Edwards 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
William R. Rawlings 
LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM R. RAWLINGS 
11576 South State Street, Suite 503 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Joe D, TREMBLY, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
MRS. FIELDS COOKIES, Defendant and Ap-
pellee. 
No. 930635-CA. 
Nov. 10, 1994. 
Former employee sued former employer for breach 
of implied-in-fact employment contract, breach of 
written contract, breach of covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, misrepresentation, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The Third District 
Court, Summit County, David S. Young, J., after 
denial of employer's summary judgment motion by 
previous judge, granted summary judgment for em-
ployer, finding that employee's employment was at-
will. Employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Davis, J., held that: (1) judge could reconsider prior 
denial of summary judgment, and (2) employee 
failed to prove that he was employed other than at-
will. 
Affirmed. 
|1] Judgment 228 €=^345 
228 Judgment 
228IX Opening or Vacating 
228k345 k. Judgments Which May Be 
Opened or Vacated. Most Cited Cases 
Motion for relief from judgment "for any other 
reason justifying relief was not available, where 
party was asking court to reconsider denial of mo-
tion for summary judgment, which is not final order 
or judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b)(7). 
[2J Courts 106 €==>99(1) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
as Law of the Case 
106k99(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In action in which multiple claims or multiple 
parties are involved, court may change its position 
with respect to any order or decision before final 
judgment is rendered. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). 
[3] Judgment 228 C=>186 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228kl86 k. Hearing and Determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
Party's motion for relief from denial of summary 
judgment motion would be treated as motion for re-
vision of order in action involving multiple claims 
or multiple parties before entry of final judgment, 
as substance, not caption of motion is dispositive in 
determining character of motion. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rules 54(b), 60(b)(7). 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228k 186 k. Hearing and Determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
Decision to entertain motion for revision of order in 
action involving multiple claims or multiple parties 
prior to entry of final judgment is question of law. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). 
15] Courts 106 C=>99(1) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
West Headnotes |4) Judgment 228 €^>186 
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106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
as Law of the Case 
106k99(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Rule which permits court to revise order in action 
involving multiple claims or multiple parties prior 
to entry of final judgment allows for possibility of 
judge changing his or her mind. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 54(b). 
j6] Judgment 228 C=>186 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228kl86 k. Hearing and Determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
Motion for revision of order in action involving 
multiple parties or multiple claims prior to entry of 
final judgment is proper vehicle to ask court to re-
consider prior denial of motion for summary judg-
ment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). 
171 Motions 267 C=>39 
267 Motions 
267k39 k. Reargument or Rehearing. Most Cited 
Cases 
Court can consider several factors in determining 
propriety of reconsidering prior ruling, including 
but not limited to whether: matter is presented in 
different light or under different circumstances; 
there has been change in governing law; party of-
fers new evidence; manifest injustice will result if 
court does not reconsider prior ruling; court needs 
to correct its own errors; or issue was inadequately 
briefed when first contemplated by court. 
|8) Judgment 228 C=>186 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228k 186 k. Hearing and Determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
Judge relied on proper grounds for reconsidering 
denial of employer's motion for summary judgment 
on employee's implied-in-fact contract claim by dif-
ferent judge in same action, where judge believed 
that cases which were decided after denial of mo-
tion warranted reconsideration. 
(9) Courts 106 €=>99(7) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
as Law of the Case 
106k99(7) k. Different Courts or 
Judges, Rulings By. Most Cited Cases 
"Law of the case" doctrine, which provides that one 
district court judge cannot overrule another district 
court judge of equal authority, has evolved to avoid 
delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is 
presented with issue identical to one which has 
already been passed upon by coordinate judge in 
same case. 
[101 Courts 106 C=>90(1) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k88 Previous Decisions as Controlling 
or as Precedents 
106k90 Decisions of Same Court or 
Co-Ordinate Court 
106k90(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Notwithstanding law of the case doctrine, trial court 
is not inexorably bound by its own precedents. 
[11] Courts 106 €=>99(1) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
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as Law of the Case 
106k99(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Judge is free to change ruling in case involving 
multiple claims or multiple parties until final de-
cision is formally rendered. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
54(b). 
(121 Courts 106 €=>99(3) 
106 Courts 
106II Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
as Law of the Case 
106k99(3) k. Jurisdiction, Dismissal, 
Nonsuit, and Summary Judgment, Rulings Relating 
To. Most Cited Cases 
Denial of motion for summary judgment was not fi-
nal order, and thus law of the case doctrine did not 
preclude judge from revisiting prior ruling of dif-
ferent judge in same action. 
[13) Courts 106 €=^99(7) 
106 Courts 
10611 Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
as Law of the Case 
106k99(7) k. Different Courts or 
Judges, Rulings By. Most Cited Cases 
Single judge is entitled to correct any interim order 
previously made, and even though a location within 
a judicial district is on a rotating judge calendar, 
authority of judge who actually decides case on 
merits to correct previously entered order is undi-
minished. 
[141 Courts 106 C=>99(7) 
106 Courts 
10611 Establishment, Organization, and Proced-
ure 
10611(G) Rules of Decision 
106k99 Previous Decisions in Same Case 
as Law of the Case 
106k99(7) k. Different Courts or 
Judges, Rulings By. Most Cited Cases 
Judges 227 €=>24 
227 Judges 
227III Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities 
227k24 k. Judicial Powers and Functions in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
On rotating calendar, two judges, while different 
persons, constitute single judicial office for law of 
the case purposes. 
[15J Appeal and Error 30 €=>949 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k949 k. Allowance of Remedy and 
Matters of Procedure in General. Most Cited Cases 
Motions 267 €=>39 
267 Motions 
267k39 k. Reargument or Rehearing. Most Cited 
Cases 
It is within sound discretion of trial court to grant 
motion for revision of order in case involving mul-
tiple claims or multiple parties prior to entry of fi-
nal judgment, and discretion to do so will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). 
[16] Judgment 228 €=^186 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 182 Motion or Other Application 
228kl86 k. Hearing and Determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
Judge did not abuse his discretion, in wrongful ter-
mination action, by granting employer's motion for 
relief, based on cases which were decided after 
judge who had previously been handling action 
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denied summary judgment on employee's implied-
in-fact contract claim, where one case considered 
issues similar to those raised in case at bar, and 
facts in other case were analogous to the facts in 
case at bar, and in that case the state Supreme Court 
held that plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to sur-
vive motion for summary judgment. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). 
[171 Appeal and Error 30 €>=>842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Whether summary judgment was appropriate is 
question of law and Court of Appeals grants no de-
ference to trial court's decision, but rather, reviews 
it for correctness. 
[181 Appeal and Error 30 €=>934(1) 




30k934(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
When reviewing grant of summary judgment, Court 
of Appeals liberally construes all inferences that 
may reasonably be drawn from facts in favor of 
nonmoving party. 
[191 Labor and Employment 231H C=?58 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk58 k. Questions of Law and Fact as to 
Employment Status. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k43 Master and Servant) 
Although existence of implied-in-fact employment 
contract is normally question of fact left to discre-
tion of jury, court retains power to decide whether, 
as matter of law, reasonable jury could find that im-
plied contract exists. 
[20J Labor and Employment 231H C=*51 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy 
Statements 
231Hk51 k. Particular Cases. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 255k4 Master and Servant) 
Employee had no implied-in-fact employment con-
tract with employer whereby he could be termin-
ated only after certain disciplinary procedures were 
followed; employee handbook which unequivocally 
reserved at-will employer status and right to ter-
minate employee at any time with or without cause 
was issued after alleged representations were made, 
employee retained employment with employer with 
full knowledge of modified condition of his em-
ployment, and retention of employment constituted 
acceptance of offer to remain employed at employ-
er as at-will employee. 
[211 Contracts 95 €=>28(3) 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95k28 Evidence of Agreement 
95k28(3) k. Weight and Sufficiency. 
Most Cited Cases 
Although evidence of oral statements standing 
alone may establish implied-in-fact contract, such 
evidence must be sufficient to fulfill requirements 
of unilateral offer. 
[221 Labor and Employment 231H C==>50 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk49 Manuals, Handbooks, and Policy 
Statements 
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231Hk50 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant) 
If employee has knowledge of distributed handbook 
that changes condition of employee's employment 
and employee remains in company's employ, modi-
fied conditions become part of employee's employ-
ment contract. 
[23J Labor and Employment 231H €=>47 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
231Hk47 k. Modification or Rescission of 
Contract. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant) 
Original employment contract may be modified or 
replaced by subsequent unilateral contract. 
[24] Labor and Employment 231H €==>47 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
231Hk47 k. Modification or Rescission of 
Contract. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k7 Master and Servant) 
Employee's retention of employment after modific-
ation or replacement of original employment con-
tract by subsequent unilateral contract constitutes 
acceptance of offer of unilateral contract; by con-
tinuing to stay on job, although free to leave, em-
ployment supplies necessary consideration for of- fer. 
[25] Labor and Employment 231H €=>34(2) 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
23 lHk31 Contracts 
231Hk34 Formation; Requisites and 
Validity 
231Hk34(2) k. Particular Cases. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k3(l) Master and Servant) 
Labor and Employment 231H €=>40(3) 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination 
231Hk40 Definite or Indefinite Term; 
Employment At-Will 
231Hk40(3) k. Particular Cases. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k3(l) Master and Servant) 
General statements of fairness made to oil company 
employees through training video were not suffi-
ciently definite to operate as contract provision and 
were not of such nature that employee could reas-
onably believe that employer intended to make him 
offer of employment other than at-will. 
[26] Labor and Employment 231H C=>40(3) 
231H Labor and Employment 
231HI In General 
231Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination 
231Hk40 Definite or Indefinite Term; 
Employment At-Will 
231Hk40(3) k. Particular Cases. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k3(2) Master and Servant) 
Simply being informed that other employees could 
not be terminated without just cause did not neces-
sarily grant same right to employee. 
[27) Labor and Employment 231H €=^47 
231H Labor and Employment 
231 HI In General 
231Hk47 k. Modification or Rescission of 
Contract. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 255k40(3.1) Master and Servant) 
In order to prove that employment status was other 
than at-will, employee had to point to affirmative 
and definite acts of employer which demonstrated 
employer's intent to modify its at-will contract with 
employee. 
*1308 Russell C. Fericks (Argued), Nathan R. 
Hyde, Gerald J. Lallatin, Richards, Brandt, Miller 
& Nelson, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Randall N. Skanchy, Deno G. Himonas (Argued), 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake 
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City, for appellee. 
Before BENCH, DAVIS and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Plaintiff Joe D. Trembly appeals the trial court's 
consideration of defendant Mrs. Fields Cookies's 
(Mrs. Fields) motion for relief from an earlier deni-
al of Mrs. Fields's motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court granted the motion and, pursuant to 
the relief requested, granted summary judgment in 
favor of Mrs. Fields, concluding that the undisputed 
facts established as a matter of law that Trembly 
was an at-will employee of Mrs. Fields. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Trembly was employed with Mrs. Fields in both 
staff and managerial positions from November 26, 
1986 until his termination on March 13, 1990. 
When Trembly applied for *1309 a position with 
Mrs. Fields, he signed an application for employ-
ment, at the top of which was the declaration that 
"[a]ll employees of [Mrs. Fields] are 'at-will' em-
ployees subject to termination at anytime [sic] with 
or without cause." Immediately above Trembly's 
signature on the application is the statement "I 
[Trembly] understand and agree that my employ-
ment is for no definite period and may ... be termin-
ated at any time without any previous notice." 
Several oral statements were made to Trembly con-
cerning Mrs. Fields's disciplinary and termination 
policies. During Trembly's initial interview with 
Mitchell Dorin, Mrs. Fields's Regional Director of 
Operations, Dorin informed Trembly that he 
(Trembly) would be allowed "X amount of mis-
takes" and that certain stages of discipline would be 
followed before he would be "disciplined" 
(terminated). Later in Trembly's employment with 
Mrs. Fields, Cindy Reisner, Mrs. Fields's Director 
of Personnel, told Trembly that, as district manager, 
he could not fire anyone at Mrs. Fields without just 
cause. 
In training videos, Randy Fields, Mrs. Fields's 
Chairman, stated that Mrs. Fields treats its people 
fairly and that a Mrs. Fields employee "will not be 
terminated for things unless they've been ... com-
pletely investigated fairly." Randy Fields also said 
that "the values of the company were more import-
ant than the training manual and that first and fore-
most is fair treatment of employees." The training 
videos were intended for all employees. 
During Trembly's tenure at Mrs. Fields, a policy 
and procedure manual was in place. The policy and 
procedure manual was replete with references to the 
at-will nature of each individual's employment 
status. In November 1989, an Employee Handbook 
(handbook) was distributed, which, by its terms, su-
perseded all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and 
procedures issued by Mrs. Fields. The handbook 
was distributed after the oral statements were made 
to Trembly by Dorin and Reisner, and after the 
Randy Fields's video was distributed. 
The handbook provides: 
This handbook is provided as a guide which you 
may use to familiarize yourself with [Mrs. Fields]. 
It is provided and is intended only as a helpful 
guide. It does not constitute, nor should it be con-
strued to constitute an agreement or contract of em-
ployment, express or implied, or as a promise of 
treatment in any particular manner in any given 
situation. This handbook states only general [Mrs. 
Fields's] guidelines. 
The handbook's disciplinary process includes the 
following reservation: 
[Mrs. Fields] is an "at-will" employer which means 
that any and all team members are subject to ter-
mination at anytime [sic] with or without cause. Al-
though we generally will follow a disciplinary pro-
cess because we are an at-will employer,™1 [Mrs. 
Fields] reserves the right to terminate a team mem-
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ber immediately. 
FN1. Although this statement arguably 
represents a misunderstanding of law, we 
believe the intent of the handbook is clear 
and that it is likely the comma was inad-
vertently placed after the word "employer" 
rather than after the word "process/* 
The handbook further states that Mrs. Fields will 
"generally follow[ ] a progressive discipline policy 
that involves four stages": a verbal discussion, a 
written statement outlining an employee's required 
performance, a written statement of consequences if 
an employee is not performing as required, and an 
execution of the consequences. The handbook then 
provides a list of "grounds for immediate termina-
tion." Immediately following this list is the declara-
tion that "[Mrs. Fields] is an at-will employer," that 
the list provided should not be "construed as a 
promise of specific treatment in a given situation," 
and that "[Mrs. Fields] is free to terminate an em-
ployee's employment at any time with or without 
cause." 
Trembly testified in his deposition that he had used 
this particular handbook for training a store man-
ager and had specifically talked about the at-will 
language contained in the handbook. Trembly fur-
ther testified that he understood that Mrs. Fields 
utilized an at-will employment policy and believed 
his *1310 employment relationship with Mrs. 
Fields to be "at-will." 
Mrs. Fields terminated Trembly on March 13, 1990. 
Trembly filed suit against Mrs. Fields, asserting 
five causes of action: (1) breach of implied-in-fact 
employment contract; (2) breach of written con-
tract; (3) breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; (4) misrepresentation; and (5) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Trembly filed his 
complaint in the Third Judicial District Court in 
Summit County, which operates on a rotating trial 
judge calendar. 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
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Mrs. Fields filed a motion to dismiss Trembly's 
third cause of action, which was granted by then-
presiding Judge Frank G. Noel. Mrs. Fields sub-
sequently filed a motion for summary judgment, 
seeking dismissal of Trembly's remaining causes of 
action. The trial court, through Judge Homer F. 
Wilkinson, granted summary judgment on 
Trembly's fourth and fifth causes of action, but 
denied summary judgment on Trembly's first and 
second claims. 
Mrs. Fields filed a motion for reconsideration of 
Judge Wilkinson's denial of summary judgment 
with respect to Trembly's first and second causes of 
action. Judge Wilkinson partially granted the mo-
tion, dismissing count two of Trembly's complaint, 
but leaving intact Trembly's implied-in-fact em-
ployment contract claim. Mrs. Fields subsequently 
filed a motion for relief from that order, basing it 
upon the then recent Utah Supreme Court decisions 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303 
(Utah 1992), and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 
P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). Judge David S. Young, who 
had rotated into the court replacing Judge Wilkin-
son, granted the motion for relief and rendered 
summary judgment in Mrs. Fields's favor on the 
grounds that the holdings in Sanderson and Hodg-
son and the undisputed facts established, as a mat-
ter of law, that Trembly's "employment relationship 
with [Mrs. Fields] was 'at-will.' " 
Trembly appeals. 
ISSUES 
This appeal raises three issues: (1) Whether Judge 
Young erred in entertaining Mrs. Fields's motion 
for relief; (2) whether Judge Young erred by grant-
ing the motion; and (3) whether the undisputed 
evidence creates a material issue of fact as to 
whether Trembly had an implied-in-fact employ-
ment contract providing he would be terminated 
only for cause and, accordingly, whether summary 
judgment was improper. 
to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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ANALYSIS 
[1][2][3][4] Trembly claims that Judge Young erred 
in hearing Mrs. Fields's motion ¥H2 because no 
new facts were presented and because entertaining 
the motion violated the "law of the case" doctrine. 
The decision to entertain a motion under Rule 54(b) 
is a question of law. " 'We accord conclusions of 
law no particular deference, but review them for 
correctness.* " Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons 
Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App.1991) (quoting 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985)). 
FN2. Mrs. Fields brought its motion pursu-
ant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. However, by its terms, 
Rule 60(b)(7) applies only to motions for 
relief from a final judgment or order. Utah 
R.Civ.P. 60(b). But see Rees v. Albertson's, 
Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Utah 1978) 
(suggesting in dicta that Rule 60(b)(7) is 
appropriate mechanism to request recon-
sideration of earlier denial of motion for 
summary judgment). In this case, Mrs. 
Fields was asking the court to reconsider 
the denial of a motion for summary judg-
ment, which is not a final order or judg-
ment. Thus, a motion under Rule 60(b)(7) 
is not available. Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, allows 
a court to change its position with respect 
to any order or decision before a final 
judgment has been rendered in the case. 
See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 
1184-85 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 
(Utah App.1988). Because the substance, 
not caption, of a motion is dispositive in 
determining the character of the motion, 
see State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 
(Utah App.1994), we will treat Mrs. 
Fields's motion as a Rule 54(b) motion. 
[5][6] Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure provides, in pertinent part, that 
any order or other form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties ... is *1311 subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Id. Rule 54(b) allows "for the possibility of a judge 
changing his or her mind in cases involving mul-
tiple parties or multiple claims." Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 
App.1988). Thus, a motion under Rule 54(b) is a 
proper vehicle to ask the court to reconsider its pri-
or denial of a motion for summary judgment. Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993); 
James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 44 & n. 5. 
[7] A court can consider several factors in determ-
ining the propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. 
These may include, but are not limited to, when (1) 
the matter is presented in a "different light" or un-
der "different circumstances;" (2) there has been a 
change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new 
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the 
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a 
court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue 
was inadequately briefed when first contemplated 
by the court. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 n. 2 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
[8] Mrs. Fields based its motion on Sanderson v. 
First Sec. Leasing, 844 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992), and 
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 
1992), which the supreme court decided after Judge 
Wilkinson denied Mrs. Fields's motion for sum-
mary judgment on Trembly's implied-in-fact con-
tract claim. Mrs. Fields apparently believed that 
these decisions presented the case at bar in a differ-
ent light because of the factual similarities,™3 and 
because the Utah Supreme Court in Hodgson held 
that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evid-
ence to withstand summary judgment. Judge Young 
agreed, stating that "if this were my case and I had 
handled it throughout, I would have called it back 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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with the additional cases [Sanderson and Hodgson ] 
and would have ruled consistent with what I have 
now done " Judge Young therefore relied on proper 
grounds for reconsidering the ruling previously 
made by Judge Wilkinson 
FN3 The plaintiff m Hodgson also relied 
on statements made to her by her super-
visor in a preemployment interview and 
the disciplinary treatment of other employ-
ees to support her implied-in-fact contract 
claim 
[9][10][11][12][13][14] Trembly's next contention 
of error is that the trial court heard Mrs Fields's 
motion in violation of the "law of the case" doc-
trine, which provides that "one district court judge 
cannot overrule another district court judge of equal 
authority" Mascaro v Davis, 741 P2d 938, 946 
(Utah 1987) This doctrine has "evolved to avoid 
the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge 
is presented with an issue identical to one which 
has already been passed upon by a coordinate judge 
in the same case" Id at 947 (footnote omitted) 
Notwithstanding the law of the case doctrine, " 'a 
trial court is not inexorably bound by its own pre-
cedents ' " James Constructors, 761 P2d at 45 
(quotation omitted) "[T]he law of the case doctrine 
does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake 
and fixing i t" Gdlmor v Wright, 850 P 2d 431, 439 
(Utah 1993) (Orme, J , concurring) Moreover, a 
judge is free to change a ruling until a final de-
cision is formally rendered Utah R Civ P 54(b), 
Ron Shepherd Ins v Shields, 882 P 2d 650, 652-54 
(Utah 1994), McKee v Williams, 741 P 2d 978, 981 
(Utah App 1987), cf Richardson v Grand Central 
Corp, 572 P 2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) ("[Generally 
preliminary or interim rulings do not rise to the dig-
nity of res judicata or stare decisis ") In this case, 
the denial of the motion for summary judgment was 
not a final order Thus, the law of the case doctrine 
did not preclude Judge Young from revisiting Judge 
Wilkinson's prior rulingFN4 
FN4 The fact that Judge Young replaced 
Judge Wilkinson is of no significance A 
L a g e 1UU1 1L 
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smgle judge is entitled to correct any inter-
im order previously made, and even though 
a location within a judicial district is on a 
rotating judge calendar, the authority of the 
judge who actually decides the case on the 
merits to correct a previously entered order 
is undiminished On a rotating calendar, 
"[i]n a sense, the two judges, while differ-
ent persons, constitute a single judicial of-
fice for law of the case purposes " Gdlmor 
v Wright, 850 P 2d 431, 439-40 (Utah 
1993) (Orme, J , concurring) 
*1312 [15] Because we hold that the trial court did 
not err m entertaining Mrs Fields's motion, we 
must next determine whether the trial court prop-
erly granted the motion It is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court to grant a motion under 
Rule 54(b), and the decision to do so will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of this discre-
tion State v Smith, 781 P 2d 879, 882 n 4 (Utah 
App 1989) 
[16] After reviewing the record and the holdings in 
Sanderson and Hodgson, we cannot say that Judge 
Young abused his discretion by granting Mrs 
Fields's motion for relief Judge Young based his 
decision on Sanderson and Hodgson, which were 
decided after Judge Wilkinson denied summary 
judgment on Trembly's implied-in-fact contract 
claim Sanderson considered issues similar to those 
raised in the case at bar, the facts m Hodgson are 
analogous to the facts in this case,FN5 with the 
Utah Supreme Court holding that the plaintiffs 
evidence was insufficient to survive summary judg-
ment On this basis, Mrs Fields's motion under 
Rule 54(b) justified relief, and we decline to re-
verse Judge Young's decision to grant the motion 
FN5 See discussion, footnote 2 
[17][18][19] We now address the last issue raised 
by Trembly whether the trial court erred m grant-
ing summary judgment m favor of Mrs Fields 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Sanderson, 844 P.2d at 306. Whether summary 
judgment was appropriate is a question of law and 
we grant no deference to the trial court's decision, 
but review it for correctness. Richins, 817 P.2d at 
385. When reviewing a grant of summary judg-
ment, we liberally construe all inferences that may 
be reasonably drawn from the facts in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 
818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991). Although the ex-
istence of an implied-in-fact employment contract 
is normally a question of fact left to the discretion 
of the jury, "the court retains the power to decide 
whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury could 
find that an implied contract exists." Sanderson, 
844 P.2d at 306. "If a reasonable jury cannot find 
that an implied contract exists, summary judgment 
is appropriate." Id. (citations omitted). 
[20] Thus, we must determine whether there is a 
dispute of material fact as to whether Trembly had 
an implied-in-fact employment contract with Mrs. 
Fields where Trembly would be terminated only 
after certain disciplinary procedures were followed. 
Trembly claims that the verbal assertions made to 
him and language contained in the company policy 
and procedures manual created an implied-in-fact 
employment contract where he could be terminated 
only after certain disciplinary procedures were fol-
lowed, even though the subsequent handbook con-
tained disclaimers dismissing any possibility of a 
contract of employment other than at-will. 
[21] In Johnson, the supreme court stated that in or-
der for an 
implied-in-fact contract term to exist, it must meet 
the requirements for an offer of a unilateral con-
tract. There must be a manifestation of the employ-
er's intent that is communicated to the employee 
and sufficiently definite to operate as a contract 
provision [so that] the employee can reasonably be-
lieve that the employer is making an offer of em-
ployment other than employment at will. 
Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002 (footnote omitted). 
While it is clear that evidence of oral statements 
standing alone may establish an implied-in-fact 
contract, Hodgson, 844 P.2d at 334, such evidence 
"must be sufficient to fulfill the requirements of a 
unilateral offer." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002. 
[22][23][24] Trembly claims that the statements 
made to him by Mitchell Dorin are sufficiently def-
inite to operate as a "contract provision." However, 
even if we agree with Trembly, if an employee has 
knowledge of a distributed handbook that changes a 
condition of the employee's employment, and the 
employee remains in the company's employ, the 
modified conditions become part of the employee's 
employment contract. Id.; see also *1313Sorenson 
v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 
1148 (Utah App.1994) (earlier version of com-
pany's code of conduct arguably modifying employ-
ee's at-will status was expressly superseded by later 
version). Further, 
"[i]n this manner, an original employment contract 
may be modified or replaced by a subsequent uni-
lateral contract. The employee's retention of em-
ployment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a 
unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, 
although free to leave, the employment supplies the 
necessary consideration for the offer." 
Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002 (quoting Pine River 
State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 
(Minn. 1983)). Thus, even if Dorin's oral assertions 
to Trembly modified his at-will status with Mrs. 
Fields, the handbook clearly superseded and re-
placed that agreement. In the handbook, Mrs. Fields 
unequivocally reserved its at-will employer status 
and the right to terminate an employee at any time 
with or without cause. Trembly testified that he was 
familiar with this at-will language. Therefore, 
Trembly could not have reasonably concluded, after 
distribution of the handbook, that his employment 
was other than at-will on the basis of Dorin's state-
ments. Mrs. Fields eliminated any confusion re-
garding employment status by the clear and con-
spicuous disclaimers contained in the handbook, 
which was distributed after Dorin made his com-
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ments to Trembly. Trembly retained his employ-
ment with Mrs. Fields with full knowledge of the 
modified condition of his employment and his re-
tention constituted his acceptance of Mrs. Fields's 
offer: to remain employed at Mrs. Fields as an at-
will employee. 
[25] Trembly's reliance on oral statements made by 
Randy Fields and Cindy Reisner is also misplaced. 
Trembly claims that Randy Fields's statements to 
employees in company videos regarding fairness 
modified Trembly's at-will employment status to 
one where he could be terminated only for cause. 
Not only does this argument fail because Trembly 
saw the video before the handbook was distributed, 
but also because general statements of fairness 
made to all company employees through a training 
video are not sufficiently definite to operate as a 
contract provision and are not of such a nature that 
Trembly could reasonably believe that Mrs. Fields 
intended to make him an offer of employment other 
than at-will. See Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002. 
[26] [27] Reisner informed Trembly that he could 
not terminate any Mrs. Fields's employee without 
just cause and, based on this assertion, Trembly 
claims his at-will status was modified. As with the 
statements made by Dorin and Randy Fields, Reis-
ner's disclosure was made before the handbook was 
distributed and was, therefore, of no consequence to 
Trembly. Further, simply being informed that other 
employees could not be terminated without just 
cause does not necessarily grant the same right to 
Trembly. Sorenson, 873 P.2d at 1148; accord 
Kirberg v. West One Bank, 872 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 
App.1994). Trembly is required to "point to affirm-
ative and definite acts of [Mrs. Fields] demonstrat-
ing [Mrs. Fields's] intent to modify its at-will con-
tract with [Trembly]." Kirberg, 872 P.2d at 42. This 
he is unable to do. 
Lastly, Trembly relies on language in the policy 
and procedure manual to support his claim that he 
could be terminated only after Mrs. Fields followed 
certain disciplinary procedures. However, the 
policy and procedures manual was superseded by 
the handbook, which stated "[t]his handbook super-
sedes all prior handbooks, manuals, policies and 
procedures issued by the Company." Thus, we re-
ject Trembly's reliance on this manual. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Young properly heard Mrs. Fields's motion 
for relief brought pursuant to Rule 54(b), and did 
not abuse his discretion in granting that motion. 
Summary judgment was correct because, as a mat-
ter of law, even if Trembly's initial employment 
contract provided that he would be terminated only 
after Mrs. Fields followed certain disciplinary pro-
cedures, this employment status was later modified 
by the handbook, which provided that Trembly was 
an at-will employee. Trembly accepted this contract 
provision by *1314 remaining in Mrs. Fields's em-
ploy after he had knowledge of the company's at-
will employment policy. Accordingly, we affirm. 
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur. 
Utah App., 1994. 
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, NATION-
AL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
EZRA C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. Cordell Lundahl et 
al., Defendants and Appellant. 
No, 11359. 
May 20, 1969. 
Action by bank against depositors to recover for 
dishonored check. The First District Court, Cache 
County, Lewis Jones, J., found for bank and depos-
itors appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C.J., 
held that where jury found that bank had not noti-
fied depositors of dishonor of check and that agree-
ment executed by bank and depositors at time of 
sale of depositors' business to third party consti-
tuted accord and satisfaction, trial judge improperly 
allowed bank to recover on check. 
Reversed. 
Henriod, J., dissented. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Banks and Banking 52 €==>171(5) 
52 Banks and Banking 
52III Functions and Dealings 
52111(D) Collections 
52k 171 Failure to Collect 
52kl71(5) k. Duty to Give Notice of 
Nonacceptance or Nonpayment. Most Cited Cases 
Bank which failed to give notice to its depositor of 
dishonor of check was responsible for resulting 
loss. U.C.A.1953, §§ 70A-4-104(l) (h), 
70A-4-201(l), 70A-4-212, 70A-4-212(l). 
|2J Accord and Satisfaction 8 €=>26(3) 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
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8k26 Evidence 
8k26(3) k. Sufficiency. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence sustained finding that settlement agree-
ment which was entered into between bank and de-
positors at time of closing of sale of depositors' 
business to third party constituted an accord and 
satisfaction and discharged depositors from any li-
ability on check which had previously been forwar-
ded by bank to drawee bank for collection. 
[3J Trial 388 €=^362 
388 Trial 
388IX Verdict 
388IX(B) Special Interrogatories and Find-
ings 
388k362 k. Amendment or Correction of 
Findings. Most Cited Cases 
Where case is submitted to jury on special verdicts, 
trial court may make corrections of obvious errors 
and may make additional findings but may not 
make findings inconsistent with jury's determina-
tion. 
[4] Accord and Satisfaction 8 €>=>23 
8 Accord and Satisfaction 
8k23 k. Operation and Effect of Satisfaction. 
Most Cited Cases 
Where jury found that bank had not notified depos-
itor of dishonor of check and that agreement ex-
ecuted between bank and depositors at time of sale 
of depositors' business to third party constituted ac-
cord and satisfaction, trial judge improperly al-
lowed bank to recover on check. 
**887 *433 Walter G. Mann, Reed W. Hadfield, 
Richard F. Gordon, Brigham City, for appellant. 
Chas. P. Olson, of Olson & Hoggan, Logan, Don B. 
Allen, Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice. 
In this suit plaintiff First Security Bank contests 
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with the defendants, the Lundahls, as to who bears 
the loss on an $8100 check *434 which the 
Lundahls had deposited with the plaintiff bank. The 
plaintiff sent the check for collection, but it was 
never paid. The Lundahls asserted two defenses: (1) 
that because the bank negligently failed to give no-
tice as required by the commercial code, it lost the 
right to charge it back to defendants' account, and 
(2) that there was an accord and satisfaction with 
respect to it. 
When the check was dishonored by the payor bank, 
First Security Bank charged back the check against 
the defendants' account, obtaining the $893.93 in 
the account at the time and creating an 'overdraft' 
of $7206.07. Although a jury answered interrogat-
ories favorable to defendants on the issues of fail-
ure to give notice and accord and satisfaction, the 
trial court, on the basis of 'further findings,' 
rendered judgment for the plaintiff for $7206.07. 
Defendants were awarded $893.93 as an offset on 
their counterclaim. Defendants appeal. 
Wherever there is dispute, it is our duty on review 
to accept as fact that evidence and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom which supports 
the jury verdict. [FN 1] 
FN1. Niemann v. Grand Central Market, 
Inc., 9 Utah 2d 46, 337 P.2d 424 (1959). 
In July, 1966, the corporate defendant, a manufac-
turer of farm machinery in Logan, Utah, sold sever-
al pieces of equipment to Heathfield Equipment, 
Ltd., of Kamloops, British Columbia. One of the 
checks received by defendants as payment for the 
equipment was for $8121.88. This check was de-
posited in the plaintiff bank on July 28, 1966. It 
was sent to the Royal Bank of Canada for payment, 
but it was there dishonored. The check was returned 
to Logan and the plaintiff bank charged back the 
amount of the check to the defendants' account. At 
about this time, however, and for reasons not im-
portant here, the check was lost and the Lundahls 
were required to obtain a second check from Heath-
field to replace it. 
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The second check was received on November 15, 
1966, and was deposited with plaintiff bank to 
Lundahls' account on December 5, 1966. By a letter 
dated December 9, 1966, the Canadian bank gave 
notice to First Security of insufficient funds to pay 
the check, but that it would be held for payment un-
less otherwise instructed. However, according to 
the jury's finding, First Security did not then give 
notice of dishonor to the defendants. 
Meanwhile, the Lundahls had been negotiating with 
a Hesston Corporation to sell their business and had 
entered into a contract to do so on July 29, 1966. 
The provisions of interest here are that by Decem-
ber 1, 1966, Hesston would deposit with the 
plaintiff, in escrow, $187,000 to be held for certain 
specified dispositions for the benefit of the 
Lundahls, including the payment of their debts, and 
that by January 1, 1967, *435 Lundahls were to 
'fully pay, satisfy or obtain release of all debts, 
wages, accounts, taxes, liabilities' owed by or out-
standing against them. It is pertinent to note that 
plaintiff First Security Bank had a copy of this 
since it was acting as the escrow agent. 
On January 4, 1967, the Lundahls met with repres-
entatives of Hesston and plaintiff bank to complete 
the transaction. At this meeting, defendants were in 
possession **888 of a letter from the plaintiff bank 
setting out all their direct obligations, a total of 
$75,648.73, and another letter setting out their con-
tingent obligations as $2892.87. But no mention 
was made in either letter of the $100 check, which 
the bank knew had not been paid. In accordance 
with the letters, the Lundahls caused the total of the 
two amounts shown in the letters, $78,402.55 of the 
escrow money, to be paid to the bank. Ezra C. 
Lundahl and E. Cordell Lundahl testified that after 
this amount was paid they asked for the return of 
their guaranty, which had been entered into in May, 
1964, by the individual defendants for the Lundahl 
corporation accounts. They testified that the parties 
agreed that it was to be returned later with other pa-
pers. 
It was about a month and a half later, by a letter 
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dated February 16, 1967, that the Royal Bank of 
Canada returned the $8100 check to the plaintiff 
bank; and on February 20, 1967, the latter charged 
that check to the Lundahl account, creating the 
Overdraft' therein of $7206.07. The Lundahls 
questioned the bank's right to do so, and that is the 
pivotal question in this case. 
[1] The plaintiffs contention is that it had accepted 
the check in question as an agent for collection 
only, and that it took upon itself no liability as the 
owner of the check. It is true that under the Uni-
form Commercial Code there is a presumption that 
a collecting bank acts as agent for its depositor. 
Sec. 70A-4-201(l), U.C.A.1953. However, this pre-
supposes that the bank acts in accordance with its 
duty imposed by law; and this requires presentation 
to the payor bank in the due course of business, 
and, if the check is dishonored, notice to its depos-
itor 'by its midnight deadline [FN2] or within a 
longer reasonable time' under the circumstances. 
Sec. 70A-4-212(l), U.C.A.1953. If there is a sub-
stantial failure of the bank to perform this duty, it 
loses its right of charge-back. Sec. 70A-4-212, 
U.C.A.1953. The issue with respect to this duty was 
found against the plaintiff by the jury's answer to an 
interrogatory that: 
FN2. The "Midnight deadline* with respect 
to a bank is midnight on its next banking 
day following the banking day on which it 
receives the relevant item or notice or from 
which the time for taking action com-
mences to run, whichever is later.' Sec. 
70A-4-104(l)(h), U.C.A.1953. 
We find the Bank was negligent because they failed 
to notify Lundahls Inc. in the time prescribed by 
law, or a reasonable*436 time, about the second 
check not being honored by the Royal Bank of 
Canada. 
This failure of the plaintiff bank to discharge its 
duty prescribed by the statutes discussed above 
makes it responsible for the resulting loss. Evidence 
was presented to the effect that with the passage of 
time conditions of the Heathfield Company 
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changed substantially, and that if timely notice had 
been given, there would have been no loss due to its 
insolvency. 
The resolution of the issue on accord and satisfac-
tion by the jury also supports the position of the de-
fendants so plainly that it is hardly susceptible of 
misunderstanding. Interrogatory No. 4 asked them: 
Was there a complete accord and satisfaction 
between the parties on or about January 4, 1967, 
whereby all accounts were settled and compromised 
between the parties, including a promise, if any you 
find, on the part of the bank to surrender up the 
written guaranty? 
To this the jury answered: 
We the jury, agree on the first part of question No. 
4. There was complete accord and satisfaction 
between the parties on January 4, 1967. We find 
that the guaranty was included in said agreement. 
[2] It is the Lundahls' position and testimony that 
the various amounts to be paid to the bank were 
discussed, particularly that a reference was made to 
the $8121.88 obligation, that as a result of their dis-
cussion of it, the interest on that item **889 was 
waived, and that the amounts referred to above, 
totaling $78,402.55, were to discharge all of their 
liabilities, direct and contingent, including the ob-
ligation in controversy. Even though the evidence 
may be susceptible of a different conclusion, as 
plaintiff argues, it is also reasonably supportive of 
the finding made by the jury that 'all accounts were 
settled and compromised between the parties.' 
The difficulty which exists in this case is that, not-
withstanding the findings of the jury in favor of de-
fendants as set forth above, which the trial court 
stated that he 'accepted,' 'approved' and found 
'true and correct,' he nevertheless awarded the 
plaintiff credit for the amount of the check. This 
was done on the basis of the court's 'further find-
ing' that the defendants knew or should have 
known of Heathfield's financial instability and, in 
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addition, that they were kept fully informed of the 
plaintiff bank's continuing efforts to collect the 
check. 
[3] The effect of this 'further finding' was actually 
to contravene the finding made by the jury that the 
plaintiff bank 'was negligent because it failed to 
give Lundahls notice in the time prescribed by law, 
or a reasonable time, about the second *437 check 
not being honored by the Royal Bank of Canada.' 
The same observation is pertinent to the action of 
the trial court with respect to the issue of accord 
and satisfaction. Notwithstanding what we have de-
lineated above, the trial court made the 'further 
finding' that the $8100 check 'was specifically 
omitted from said settlement * * V It is recognized 
that where a case is submitted to the jury on special 
verdicts, the trial court may make corrections of ob-
vious errors or defects therein, and he may make 
additional findings on issues which have not been 
submitted to the jury, but are necessary to settle the 
issues involved.[FN3] But when a party has deman-
ded a trial by jury he is entitled to have the jury 
find the facts, and it is not the trial court's prerogat-
ive to make findings inconsistent therewith and 
thereby defeat the effect of the jury's findings. 
FN3. See 53 Am.Jur. Trial s 1094. 
[4 J In consonance with the jury's answers to the in-
terrogatories and what we have said above, that part 
of the trial court's judgment allowing the plaintiff 
bank to charge the $8100 check against the defend-
ants is reversed; and the judgment awarded defend-
ants for $893.93 on their counterclaim is affirmed. 
Costs to defendants (appellants). 
CALLISTER, TUCKETT, and ELLETT, JJ., con-
cur. 
HENRIOD, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent. Although this case is 
cluttered up with numerous facts, some of a confus-
ing or contradictory character, nonetheless there are 
a few that are not disputed and which appear to me 
to be quite simple and decisive, all in harmony with 
the trial court's judgment. 
The only question in this case is whether a check 
for about $8100 made payable to defendant 
Lundahl, endorsed and deposited by Lundahl, with 
a condition imposed by Lundahl that it was for col-
lection only, places an absolute liability on the bank 
to collect the amount from the maker's bank, in 
spite of hell and high water, failing which, the bank 
an obvious agent of Lundahl, becomes, not an agent 
any more, but an unnamed surety without consider-
ation. All this because of a claim of lack of notice 
of dishonor under some real or ethereal code provi-
sion that apparently has nothing to do with a 
'deposit for collection only.' I think that the ques-
tion should be resolved in favor of the trial court's 
conclusion that under the facts of this case the bank 
is not legally liable to contribute its own money for 
the claimed 'loss' of money, that was not lost at all. 
Lundahl still has a claim for it against the maker, 
and if the amount is paid by the latter, whose oblig-
ation it is, obviously it would result in an unjust en-
richment**890 if plaintiff also paid. The circum-
stances*438 that Lundahl did not or could not pur-
sue the obligor should be no reason why a mere 
agent depositee for collection should transmute a 
primary obligation into a suretyship relationship 
sans any consensual aspect. 
It might be noted that although the main opinion at-
tributes liability to the plaintiff bank because of the 
check's dishonor by a foreign bank and First Secur-
ity's failure to give notice thereof,-that conclusion 
is not quite true under the circumstances of this 
case. The foreign bank simply notified First Secur-
ity that there were insufficient funds presently to 
pay the check but that it would be held for later 
payment unless otherwise advised. In such case 
First Security persisted in being Lundahl's agent for 
collection only, as is reflected in the bank's elimina-
tion of interest. 
I am unimpressed by the stresses and strains in-
dulged in argument anent the prerogative of the 
judge as opposed to those of the jury under a rule 
whose clarity, I would venture, has been unclarified 
and explained by not one, but many judicial inter-
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pretations, as is reflected in the annotations of both 
the state and federal rule, being 49(a) in both baili-
wicks. 
The bank should be protected against an unjust en-
richment (Restatement, Restitution, Sec. 1, Unjust 
Enrichment), particularly since there is nothing in-
imical in the Commercial Code with respect to such 
protection. 
There was no such thing as an accord and satisfac-
tion in this case with respect to the check in ques-
tion. The check simply was being held by an agent, 
for the purpose of collection only. Had this agent 
(the bank) collected on the check, but had not paid 
the proceeds over, the proceeds then may well have 
become an item includable in a true accord and sat-
isfaction atmosphere. 
The trial court should be affirmed. 
Utah 1969. 
First Sec. Bank of Utah, Nat. Ass'n v. Ezra C. 
Lundahl, Inc. 
22 Utah 2d 433, 454 P.2d 886, 6 UCC Rep.Serv. 765 
END OF DOCUMENT 





(Cite as: 604 P.2d 913) 
c 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
MEL HARDMAN PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Dick ROBINSON and Adanac Film Productions, 
Ltd., a corp., Defendants and Appellants, 
v. 
SUNN CLASSIC PICTURES, INC., a corp. and 
John Does 1 through X, whose true names are un-
known, Counterclaim Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 16366. 
Dec. 7,1979. 
Corporation brought action to recover for breach of 
defendants' contract to deliver "photoplay" about 
person known for his association with wild animals. 
Defendants counterclaimed against corporation's 
subsidiary on theory that it breached its agreement 
by failing to pay "residuals" after making movie 
based on defendants' film and work. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder, J., 
denied any recovery to corporation on its complaint 
and granted corporation judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict on the counterclaim, and defendants ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held 
that issue whether corporation or subsidiary had 
distributed defendants' photoplay, within meaning 
of the contract, was for jury and was properly sub-
mitted to it, and trial court erred in subsequently 
concluding that defendants could not recover 
merely because corporation and subsidiary did not 
use any of the film produced by defendants. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
fll Estoppel 156 €=^52(5) 
156 Estoppel 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k52 Nature and Application of Estop-
pel in Pais 
156k52(5) k. Application in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
It is not consistent with principles of justice and fair 
dealing for one party to impose on another a re-
quirement that something be done to such party's 
satisfaction and then permit him to arbitrarily with-
hold his approval; equity and good conscience re-
quire that he act in good faith and prevent him from 
stubbornly refusing to acknowledge satisfaction 
without some reasonable justification for doing so. 
12] Copyrights and Intellectual Property 99 0 = ^ 
109 
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property 
9911 Intellectual Property 
99kl09 k. Remedies. Most Cited Cases 
In action in which corporation sought recovery for 
breach of defendants' contract to deliver 
"photoplay" and in which defendants counter-
claimed against corporation's subsidiary on theory 
that it breached its agreement by failing to pay 
"residuals" after making movie based on defend-
ants' film and work, issue whether corporation or 
subsidiary had distributed defendants' photoplay, 
within meaning of the contract, was for jury and 
was properly submitted to it; trial court erred in 
subsequently concluding that defendants could not 
recover merely because corporation and subsidiary 
did not use any of film produced by defendants. 
[3] Jury 230 €=>9 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k9 k. Nature and Scope in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Right to trial by jury is one which should be care-
fully guarded by the courts. 
HI Jury 230 €=>34(1) 
230 Jury 
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230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k30 Denial or Infringement of Right 
230k34 Restriction or Invasion of Func-
tions of Jury 
230k34(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 230k34(2)) 
Party who has demanded jury trial is entitled to 
have benefit of jury's findings on issues of fact, and 
it is not trial court's prerogative to disregard or nul-
lify such findings by making findings of its own. 
[51 Appeal and Error 30 €=^927(7) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k927 Dismissal, Nonsuit, Demurrer to 
Evidence, or Direction of Verdict 
30k927(7) k. Effect of Evidence and 
Inferences Therefrom on Direction of Verdict. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 C=*934(l) 




30k934(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Judgment 228 €==>199(3.2) 
228 Judgment 
228VI On Trial of Issues 
228VI(A) Rendition, Form, and Requisites in 
General 
228kl99 Notwithstanding Verdict 
228kl99(3.2) k. Evidence and Infer-
ences That May Be Considered or Drawn. Most 
Cited Cases 
Judgment 228 €=>199(3.10) 
228 Judgment 
228 VI On Trial of Issues 
228VI(A) Rendition, Form, and Requisites in 
General 
228k 199 Notwithstanding Verdict 
228kl99(3.10) k. Where There Is No 
Evidence to Sustain Verdict. Most Cited Cases 
Trial 388 €=^139.1(7) 
388 Trial 
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury 
388VI(A) Questions of Law or of Fact in 
General 
388kl39.1 Evidence 
388kl39.1(5) Submission to or With-
drawal from Jury 
388kl39.1(7) k. "No" Evidence; 
Total Failure of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
Trial 388 €=^178 
388 Trial 
388VI Taking Case or Question from Jury 
388VI(D) Direction of Verdict 
388kl78 k. Hearing and Determination. 
Most Cited Cases 
In ruling on motions which would take issues of 
fact from jury, such as motions for directed verdict 
and for judgment notwithstanding verdict, trial 
court must look at the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that reasonably may be drawn therefrom 
in light most favorable to party moved against, and 
granting of such a motion is justified only if, in so 
viewing the evidence, there is no substantial basis 
therein which would support a verdict in his favor; 
on appeal, in considering trial court's granting of 
such motions, Supreme Court looks at the evidence 
in the same manner. 
|6] Jury 230 C=>12(1) 
230 Jury 
230II Right to Trial by Jury 
230k 12 Nature of Cause of Action or Issue in 
General 
230kl2(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
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Issue in regard to damages is an issue on which 
parties are entitled to a jury trial to same extent as 
on other disputed issues of fact 
*914 John S Adams of Gustin, Adams, Kastmg & 
Liapis, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel-
lants 
Peter W Billings and Anthony L Rampton, Salt 
Lake City, for Mel Hardman Productions 
Robert S Howell and Wesley G Howell, Jr, Salt 
Lake City, for Sunn Classic Pictures 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice 
Plaintiff Mel Hardman Productions, Inc 
(hereinafter Productions) sued defendant Dick 
Robinson and his corporation, Adanac Film Pro-
ductions, (hereinafter Robinson) for breach of con-
tract for failing to deliver a nature motion picture 
based on the life of one Grizzly Adams 
Robmson denied that allegation and filed a counter-
claim agamst Schick-Sunn Classic Pictures, Inc 
(hereinafter Pictures), a subsidiary of Productions 
Robinson alleges that he fully performed the con-
tract, but that after he had delivered his film to Pro-
ductions, the latter made a movie based upon his 
idea, his film and his work, which was profitably 
sold and distributed, and that Productions breached 
its agreement when it refused to pay him the 
"residuals" provided for in their agreement 
At the close of the evidence after a five-week jury 
trial, Productions and Pictures moved for directed 
verdicts The trial court took those motions under 
advisement and submitted written interrogatories to 
the jury [FN1] After almost two days of delibera-
tion, the jury returned its answers to the interrogat-
ories They were favorable to Robinson's conten-
tions that he had not committed any matenal 
breach of his contract, and that, though he had not 
completed all of his obligations thereunder, the 
conduct of Productions constituted a waiver of his 
failure to do so Similarly, as to the counterclaim, 
the jury found that Productions or Pictures, its 
©2010 Thomson Reuters No 
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agent, had used and distributed Robinson's photo-
play, as that term was used in the contract 
FN1 Pursuant to Rule 49(a), U R C P 
Both Productions and Pictures then moved for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict The court adop-
ted the jury's finding that Robmson had not materi-
ally breached the contract and denied Productions 
any recovery on its complaint However,*915 the 
court concluded that, smce neither Productions nor 
Pictures distributed any of the actual film which 
Robmson had produced and delivered to them, he 
was "not entitled to any residuals or deferred com-
pensation" The court therefore granted the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ruled 
that Robmson should also not recover on his coun-
terclaim He appeals 
On July 24, 1973, Robinson and Productions 
entered mto a Production Agreement whereby 
Robinson was to produce a "photoplay" sufficient 
to produce a feature-length motion picture about 
one "Grizzly Adams," a histoncal character who 
was known for his friendliness and association with 
wild animals Under the agreement, Robinson was 
to produce a photoplay "to the sole satisfaction" of 
Productions "sufficient to produce a motion picture 
of not less than ninety (90) mmutes in duration, 
filmed on location in the wilds, tentatively entitled 
'Grizzly Adams' based on and pursuant to a final 
story and scnpt to be submitted" by Robinson, and 
with him playmg the mam character 
As payment therefor, Robmson was to receive 
$150,000 in four installments, plus a percentage of 
Productions' gross receipts from the sale, distribu-
tion, or other disposition of the photoplay or Pro-
ductions' rights therein The amount he was to re-
ceive was subject to deductions provided for in a 
distribution agreement between Productions and 
Pictures, and any costs incurred in the distribution, 
sale, or other disposition of the photoplay not other-
wise to be deducted under that agreement 
Robinson began filming in mid-August 1973 and 
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delivered about 20 hours of film to Productions by 
October 31, 1973. One month later, after it had paid 
Robinson the $150,000, Productions hired one John 
Mahon to assemble a preliminary film from the 
footage that had been submitted by Robinson. After 
Productions reviewed the film, they allegedly noti-
fied Robinson that the result was not satisfactory; 
and advanced him another $35,000 to complete the 
motion picture. The position of plaintiffs is that de-
fendant still failed to deliver a satisfactory motion 
picture; and in April 1974, this action was initiated 
for the money it had paid him and for claimed loss 
of profits because of his alleged breach of the 
agreement. 
On June 10, 1974, Productions employed one 
Charles Sellier "to salvage the Grizzly Adams 
project." He reviewed the film that Robinson had 
submitted and he states that it was his opinion that, 
due to the deficiencies in the film and Robinson's 
lack of cooperation, it could not be used; and that 
he proceeded to produce a different motion picture, 
entitled "The Life and Times of Grizzly Adams," 
which contained none of the actual film which had 
been produced by Robinson. This Sellier version of 
the story was released in November 1974, and is 
conceded to be a financial success. It was sub-
sequently distributed to theaters throughout the 
United States and foreign countries, and shown on 
television. It was also the basis for a weekly televi-
sion series which ran for over two years. In July of 
1975, Robinson filed his counterclaim for percent-
ages of the proceeds plaintiffs had realized from the 
distribution of that film. Following extensive dis-
covery procedures and after numerous pre-trial mo-
tions and conferences, the case came to trial on 
January 8, 1979. 
The position essayed by Productions and Pictures, 
both in the trial court and on appeal, is that the in-
tent of the term "photoplay," as used in the agree-
ment, was restricted to the specific motion picture 
on film (with sound and voice recording) actually 
produced by Robinson, and to the satisfaction of 
Productions. Whereas the position taken by the de-
fendant is that the meaning intended was more gen-
eral, including the aggregate of the name, the gen-
eral concept of the story, and the literary and work 
product, which he fashioned into the Grizzly 
Adams story, all of which he delivered to the 
plaintiffs and which they made use of. 
[1] We note our agreement with the thought that it 
is simply not consistent with principles of justice 
and fair dealing for one party to impose upon an-
other a requirement that something be done to his 
satisfaction and then arbitrarily withhold his ap-
proval. Equity and good conscience require*916 
that he act in good faith, and prevent him from 
stubbornly refusing to acknowledge satisfaction 
without some reasonable justification for doing so. 
[FN2] 
FN2. Haymore v. Levinson, 8 Utah 2d 66, 
328 P.2d 307 (1958). 
[2] In the course of the trial, the jury heard and saw 
all of the evidence relating to those issues. This in-
cluded the viewing of the Sellier version, which 
was distributed, and a three-hour edited version of 
the film which Robinson had produced and de-
livered to the plaintiffs. 
The jury was given proper instructions as to the is-
sues involved and the case was submitted to them 
on special interrogatories. Instruction No. 18 was: 
This case will be submitted to you in the form of a 
Set of questions to answer Which will resolve the 
factual issues in this case. After you have resolved 
the factual questions, the court will determine how 
your factual determinations apply to the legal issues 
involved here. 
As has been stated above, the jury answered the in-
terrogatories generally favorable to the defendant, 
and this included this pivotal question: 
Did productions or its agent distribute Robinson's 
photoplay as that term is used in the contract? 
to which the jury answered "Yes. 
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After the jury had returned its answers to the inter-
rogatories, the trial court gave further consideration 
to the plaintiffs motion for directed verdict and de-
cided to grant it In doing so, he stated 
In order for the court to determine whether or 
not the finding as to the distribution of the 
"photoplay" can stand the court has to ascertain 
whether or not the Agreement clearly defines 
the term Robinson is only entitled to deferred com-
pensation If his photoplay was distributed and box 
office receipts obtained therefrom 
Paragraph 6 of the Agreement is the only one that 
attempts to define "photoplay" and it says that it 
"shall be Deemed to mclude, (emphasis added by 
the trial court) but not limited to, a motion picture 
production consisting of 16mm Ektrachrome pro-
fessional color reversal stock film complete to the 
post-production stage produced and/or exhibited 
with or accompanied by sound and voice recording 
" This court concludes and holds that Since 
neither Productions nor Pictures ever distributed 
any of the film produced by Robmson, he is not en-
titled to any residuals nor deferred compensation 
No matter what other parts of the agreement may 
include items that may be included in the term 
"photoplay" this definition requires that Part of it 
must be the celluloid motion picture In so 
holding this court is fully aware of the rule that this 
court should accept the jury verdict if there is any 
evidence to support it (Citing cases ) 
It will be seen that, in so ruling, the trial court de-
cided to disregard the findings of the jury and to 
rule in favor of the plaintiff on the issues m dispute 
as a matter of law It is our opinion that the court 
erred in concluding that defendant Robinson could 
not recover merely because plaintiffs did not use 
any of the actual film produced by him 
The agreement provides that the term photoplay 
"shall be deemed to include, But not limited to, a 
motion picture production consistmg of film 
complete to the post-production stage " The 
©2010 Thomson Reuters No 
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defimtion of "photoplay" contained in the contract 
is an illustrative, but not an all-inclusive one From 
a consideration of the circumstances surrounding 
this contract, and the conduct of the parties with re-
spect thereto, it would not be unreasonable to con-
clude that the term "photoplay" is not necessarily 
limited to the actual film produced by Robmson 
The question as to what was mtended by the term 
"photoplay" and whether Productions or Pictures 
distributed Robinson's photoplay as that term was 
mtended to mean in the contract, was a question 
which the trial court had originally considered as a 
question of fact, and submitted to the jury for de-
termination In that regard, this Court has hereto-
fore stated 
*917 It is to be conceded that ordinarily the inter-
pretation of the terms of a document is a question 
of law for the court, but this is not necessarily true 
m all situations Where, as here, it is made to ap-
pear that the terms may have a particularized ap-
plication or meamng and there is room for uncer-
tainty or disagreement it was proper for the trial 
court to regard this dispute as an issue of fact [FN3] 
FN3 Universal Invest Co v Carpets, Inc, 
16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P 2d 564, 566 (1965) 
See also Timberlme Equip Co v St Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins Co, 281 Or 639, 576 
P 2d 1244 (1977) 
There are numerous parts of the record which are 
consistent with and support the court's initial treat-
ment of the issue as being one of fact In a minute 
entry dated July 1, 1977, in denymg Production's 
motion for summary judgment against Robmson on 
his counterclaim, the trial court stated 
The court finds that There is ambiguity in the term 
"Photoplay" m that the defimtion states it includes, 
"but is not limited to" the 16mm film This dispute 
permeates the whole transaction and leaves large is-
sues of fact to be resolved 
Similarly, in its pre-trial order of January 3, 1979, 
to Ong US Gov Works 
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the court stated that one of the issues, both as to the 
complaint and the counterclaim, was what was the 
meaning of the term "photoplay" which was to be 
delivered by Robinson, and further: 
(3) Did Productions distribute Robinson's photoplay 
or any substantial portion thereof Or a substantial 
similarity thereto. 
(Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis herein ad-
ded.) 
It will be seen from the several statements made by 
the trial court in connection with his rulings that he 
had consistently considered that the questions: as to 
the meanings of "photoplay" as used in the con-
tract, whether Robinson had breached the contract, 
and whether his photoplay had been used and dis-
tributed, were questions of fact for the jury. 
[3][4][5] As we have numerous times indicated, the 
right of trial by jury is one which should be care-
fully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party 
had demanded such a trial, he is entitled to have the 
benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact; and it 
is not the trial court's prerogative to disregard or 
nullify them by making findings of his own.[FN4] 
Therefore, in ruling on motions which take issues 
of fact from the jury (this includes both motions for 
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict), the trial court is obliged to look at the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that fairly 
may be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to 
the party moved against; [FN5] and the granting of 
such a motion is justified only if, in so viewing the 
evidence, there is no substantial basis therein which 
would support a verdict in his favor.[FN6] On ap-
peal, in considering the trial court's granting of such 
motions, we look at the evidence in the same man-
ner.[FN7] 
FN4. Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 18 Utah 
2d 135, 417 P.2d 643 (1966); First Sec. 
Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 
443, 454 P.2d 886 (1969). See statements 
in Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 
122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826 (1952); Roche 
v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 264 P.2d 855 
(1953); Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Const. Co., 
29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973). 
FN5. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 
339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967); Anderson v. 
Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 
(1973); Winters v. W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., 
Utah, 546 P.2d 603 (1976). 
FN6. Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 
394 P.2d 77 (1964); Schow v. Guardtone, 
Inc., supra, note 4; Koer v. Mayfair Mar-
kets, supra, note 5. 
FN7. Winters v. W. S. Hatch Co., Inc., 
supra, note 5; McCloud v. Baum, Utah, 
569 P.2d 1125 (1977). 
In further accord with what has been said above, 
and the conclusion we have reached, is the state-
ment the trial court made to counsel after the jury 
had been discharged: that he thought the jury had 
examined the case very carefully. Moreover, in his 
judgment on the special verdict, the court recited 
that the jury "was most cooperative during the 
course of the trial and by reason of the questions 
submitted and requests made of the court during de-
liberations was one of the most conscientious juries 
this court has observed." 
*918 On the basis of our discussion herein, it is our 
conclusion that the trial court was correct in his 
previously expressed views as to the disputed is-
sues; and also that the evidence justified submitting 
those disputed issues to the jury. Accordingly, the 
findings of the jury entitling the defendant to recov-
er on his counterclaim should be reinstated. 
[6] In view of our conclusion just stated, the ques-
tion as to damages to be assessed becomes pertin-
ent. On that subject we make these observations: 
the parties submitted different calculations as to the 
amounts of damages. When the matter of damages 
is in dispute, it is an issue upon which the parties 
are entitled to a jury trial, the same as on other dis-
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puted issues of fact. Consistent with what has been 
said herein, the case is remanded for a determina-
tion as to the damages to be awarded on the defend-
ant's counterclaim. Costs to defendant (appellant). 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS, HALL and STEWART, 
J J., concur. 
Utah, 1979. 
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